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NOTES
CHALLENGING A CONSERVATIVE
STEREOTYPE: THE REHNQUIST COURT'S
TREATMENT OF THE PRINT MEDIA AS
LIBEL DEFENDANTS
Nearly fifty years ago, Judge Learned Hand declared that the
First Amendment "presupposes that right conclusions are more
likely to be gathered out of a multitude of tongues, than through
any kind of authoritative selection. To many this is, and always will
be, folly; but we have staked upon it our all."' Defamation law
developed as a common law response to protect individuals whose
reputations are injured when those "right conclusions" are not gath-
ered.2 As Justice Stewart stated in the 1966 United States Supreme
Court case of Rosenblatt v. Baer, the individual's right to protect his
or her reputation is a reflection of the fundamental dignity of
human beings. 3
 Since 1964, when the United States Supreme Court
decided the landmark case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,4
 the
Court has struggled over the proper balance between a free press
and the individual's right to be free from wrongful injury to his or
her reputation. 5
 This Note addresses the development of this strug-
gle through coalitions of Justices and the willingness of the modern
conservative Supreme Court to uphold the First Amendment pro-
tections given to the press.
In New York Times, the United States Supreme Court held that
public officials are required to prove actual malice in order to win
libel cases.6 That is, public officials must prove that a publisher
acted with knowledge of the statement's falsity or with reckless
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964) (quoting United States v.
Associated Press, 52 F. Supp. 362, 372 (S.D.N.Y. 1943)).
2 See BRUCE W. SANFORD, LIBEL AND PRIVACY 95 (2d ed. 1991).
3
 Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75, 92 (1966) (Stewart, J., concurring).
4 376 U.S. 254, 254 (1964).
3
 See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 456 (1976).
6
 376 U.S. at 279-80.
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disregard for the truth.? Three years later, in Curtis Publishing Co.
v. Butts, the Court extended the New York Times rationale to include
public figures—defining the term to include people who are involved
in affairs of interest to the general public. 8 In the 1974 case of Gertz
v. Robert Welch, Inc., however, the Supreme Court took a different
turn and began to lessen constitutional protection of speech when
it refused to extend to private figures the New York Times rule
requiring proof of actual malice. 9 The Gertz case, with its six separate
opinions, shows a fragmented Court trying to find the proper bal-
ance of constitutionality.° By 1984, the Supreme Court once again
changed directions as it began to adopt procedural protections for
the press in libel actions."
This Note examines how, after six terms, the Rehnquist Court
has decided libel cases brought against the print media. Some com-
mentators argue that the Rehnquist Court's strategy has been to
chip slowly away at the foundation of New York Times. 12 This Note
will explore that argument and demonstrate that the modern Court
has in fact reaffirmed its commitment to New York Times, 13 although
perhaps at the expense of lessened press protection in cases involv-
ing private plaintiffs."
Section I of this Note traces the development of libel law in
cases involving the print media since the 1964 New York Times de-
cision.° It first reviews the cases decided in the decade immediately
following New York Times,I 6 and then surveys the decisions from
Id. at 280.
6 Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967).
9 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
10 Id. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 354 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 355
(Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 369 (White, J., dissenting).
Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 325.
In discussing the Court's decision three years earlier in Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc.,
Justice Powell in Gertz stated that the views of the eight Justices who wrote five separate
opinions in Rosenbloom reflected the differences in traditional thought about the problem of
reconciling libel with the First Amendment. Id. at 333. The same can be said of the six
opinions in Gertz. See generally Sheldon W. Halpern, Of Libel, Language, and Law: New York
Times v. Sullivan at Twenty-Five, 68 N.C. L. Rev. 273, 284 (1990).
° Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986); Philadelphia Newsp., Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984).
12 Martin Garbus, Courting Libel: Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. and Other Libel Suits,
NATION, Nov. 12, 1990, at 548.
13 See, e.g., Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-51 (1988).
" See, e.g., Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2705 (1990).
15 See infra notes 24-243 and accompanying text.
16 See infra notes 24-109 and accompanying text.
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1974 to 1976, beginning with Gertz, which changed the direction of
the law." Section I also examines the emerging procedural protec-
tions for the press that developed from 1984 to 1986. 16 Section II
presents the lower court opinions of the newer Justices on the
Supreme Court in order to have a stronger basis from which to
determine their views on libel actions against the print media. 19
Section III explores the victories and losses for the press under the
Rehnquist Court. 2° Section IV evaluates how the formation of co-
alitions has directed the course of libel law. 2 ' Finally, section V
examines the main concerns of each Justice in the area of libel law
and identifies the principle that guides him or her. 22 In examining
the Rehnquist Court's decisions, this Note will argue that, contrary
to critics' expectations that a conservative Court would stereotypi-
cally weaken First Amendment protections, the Rehnquist Court
has continued the tradition of previous Courts by forming coalitions
that have generally upheld press freedoms in print media libel
cases. 25
1. DEVELOPMENT OF LIBEL LAW IN PRINT MEDIA CASES SINCE 1964
A. 1964-74: The Roots of a Constitutional Doctrine
The United States Supreme Court first established constitu-
tional protection for speech concerning public officials in the 1964
case of New York Times Co. v. Sullivan. 24 The Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment serves as a limit on a state's authority to
award damages to public officials in libel suits. 25 As such, the Court
ruled that proof of actual malice, defined as knowledge of falsity
or reckless disregard for the truth, was required in order for public
officials to prevail in libel cases against those who had criticized their
official actions. 26
" See infra notes 110-78 and accompanying text.
18 See infra notes 179-243 and accompanying text.
19 See infra notes 244-355 and accompanying text.
'0 See infra notes 356-452 and accompanying text.
21 See infra notes 453-97 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 498-553 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 453-97 and accompanying text. But see also Garbus, supra note 12, at
548; Howard Kurtz, Spate of Libel Judgments May Alter News Practices; Editors See a More Hostile
Supreme Court, WASH. POST, Nov. 24,1990, at A4 (Supreme Court has been more hospitable
to libel plaintiffs by allowing multimillion-dollar libel judgments to stand).
24 376 U.S. 254,283 (1964).
23 Id.
se Id. at 279-80.
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In New York Times, L.B. Sullivan, the Commissioner of Public
Affairs of Montgomery, Alabama, brought a libel action against the
New York Times Company. 27 Sullivan alleged that he had been
libeled by a full-page advertisement entitled "Heed Their Rising
Voices," which appeared in the New York Times. 28 Although the ad
did not mention Sullivan by name, he claimed that the language
accusing the police of using violence against civil rights protesters
in Montgomery libeled him because he was the commissioner who
supervised the police department. 29 A jury awarded Sullivan
$500,000 and the Alabama Supreme Court affirmed the judg-
ment."
The United States Supreme Court reversed the judgment of
the Alabama court," holding that public officials must prove actual
malice in libel cases. 32 Writing for the Court, Justice Brennan began
by acknowledging that it was the first time the Court would deter-
mine how far the Constitution extended to limit a state's libel laws. 33
The Court in New York Times emphasized that the standards used
to measure libel must satisfy the First Amendment. 34 Justice Bren-
nan stressed the nation's deep commitment to robust debate on
public issues, which sometimes included stinging attacks on public
officials." The Court explained that erroneous statements are in-
evitable in open debate, and that such statements demanded pro-
tection in order to accord free expression its necessary "breathing
space."36 The Court compared New York Times to an historical case
of seditious libel, a concept that violated the First Amendment. 37
" Id. at 256.
" Id.
" Id. at 258.
3° Id. at 256.
31 Id. at 264.
" Id. at 283.
"Id. at 256.
" Id. at 269.
" Id. at 270.
36 Id. at 271-72 (quoting NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)).
37 Id. at 273; Anthony Lewis, New York Times v. Sullivan Reconsidered: Time to Return to
"The Central Meaning of the First Amendment," 83 COLUM. L. Km 603, 606 (1983). Seditious
libel is a statement written "with the intent to incite the people to change the government
otherwise than by lawful means, or to advocate the overthrow of the government by force
or violence." BLACK'S LAW DICIIONARY 1351 (6th ed. 1990).
The Court's opinion rested largely on the analogy to seditious libel. New York Times, 376
U.S. at 273. The Court explained that because neither error nor defamation alone was
enough to destroy the mantle of First Amendment protection given to political expression,
then the two combined could do no more. Id. Justice Brennan reasoned that this was the
lesson learned from the Sedition Act of 1798. Id. The Court explained that "the great
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The Supreme Court reasoned that truth alone could not be an
adequate defense because it could not guarantee that only false
speech would be discouraged." The Court explained that the allow-
ance of truth as the only defense would lead to self-censorship
because publishers would not print their criticisms of public officials
unless they were certain they could prove the truth of their asser-
tions." The Supreme Court thus concluded that the Constitution
dictated the need for a national standard. 4° This constitutional rule
would allow a public official to recover for defamation relating to
his or her official conduct only if he or she can prove that the
statement was made with actual malice, meaning with knowledge of
its falsity or with reckless disregard for the truth.'"
While the judgment in New York Times was unanimous, the
Court's reasoning did not convince all of the Justices. 42 In his con-
currence, Justice Black, joined , by Justice Douglas, argued that the
First Amendment provided absolute immunity for criticism of pub-
lic officials. 43 Justice Black expressed his concern that libel laws
would threaten the existence of a free and uninhibited press. 44 In
a separate concurrence, Justice Goldberg, also joined by Justice
Douglas, agreed that the First Amendment provided the press with
an unconditional privilege.45 Justice Goldberg, however, argued that
the real issue in the case was whether freedom of speech as pro-
tected by the Constitution could be properly secured by the actual
malice rule, which hinged its determination of liability on a jury's
determination as to the state of.mind of the speaker." Because he
did not believe such a rule could protect a free press, Justice Gold-
berg thus concluded that under the First Amendment the press was
immune from libel suits. 47
controversy over the Sedition Act of 1798 . . . first crystallized a national awareness of the
central meaning of the First Amendment." Id. Justice Brennan traced the history of the
Sedition Act, noting that while no one had ever challenged the Act before the Supreme
Court, history had invalidated it. Id. at 276. The Court stated that the Act had been incon-
sistent with the constitutional protection of free expression. Id.
38 New York Times, 376 U.S. at 279.
22 Id.
4° Id. at 279-80.
41 Id.
42 Id. at 293 (Black, J., concurring); id. at 297 (Goldberg, J., concurring)..
42 Id. at 295. Justice Black asserted that the minimum guarantee of the First Amendment
is "an unconditional right to say what one pleases about public affairs." Id. at 297.
" Id. at 294.
42 Id. at 298.
411 Id. at 300.
47 Id. at 298.
88	 BOSTON COLLEGE LAW REVIEW	 [Vol. 34:83
The context of New York Times—the political struggle of the
civil rights era--made the case unique." At least one commentator
has written that what makes New York Times a great opinion is its
subsequent use as the linchpin of defamation law.49 Because the
press played such an important role in showing the racial tensions
existing in the South, commentators believe that the libel suit was
used as a weapon, to which Justice Brennan responded with his
analogy to seditious libel. 50 New York Times had an instant impact on
libel law. 5 ' The same year, the Supreme Court extended the actual
malice rule to criminal libel. 52 Furthermore, public officials rarely
won libel cases for years after the Court ruled in New York Times. 53
The United States Supreme Court continued the expansion of
constitutional protection for print media in the 1967 case of Curtis
Publishing Co. v. Butts, and its companion case, Associated Press v.
Walker, by holding that public figures, like public officials, were
required to comply with the New York Times rule by proving actual
malice. 54 The Court defined public figures as persons who are in-
volved in resolving or shaping important public issues. 55 All of the
Justices agreed that public figures should be held to proving a
standard of fault, but the Justices differed as to which standard
should be applied.56
The Curtis plaintiff, a former athletic director of the University
of Georgia, sued Curtis Publishing alleging that an article appearing
in the Saturday Evening Post had libeled him." The article stated
that he fixed a football game with the head coach of the University
of Alabama. 58 In its defense, Curtis Publishing argued that the
48 Lewis, supra note 37, at 605.
49 See Halpern, supra note 10, at 275.
" Lewis, supra note 37, at 605. Lewis stated that "what was at stake . . . was more than
the fate of one newspaper. It was the ability, or the willingness, of the American press to go
on covering the racial conflict in the South as it had been doing." Id.
si Id. at 608.
" Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 77 (1964) (actual malice rule limits states in
imposing criminal sanctions for criticism of public officials).
53 Lewis, supra note 37, at 608.
54 388 U.S. 130, 164 (1967) (Warren, C.J., concurring).
55 Id. Chief Justice Warren gave this definition in his concurring opinion, which drew a
majority of votes. Id.
56 Id. at 162, 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 170, 171 (Black, J., dissenting in
Curtis, concurring in Walker); id. at 172, 172-73 (Brennan, J., dissenting in Curtis, concurring
in Walker). Justice Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 133.
57 Id. at 135,
58 Id.
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information contained in the article was true. 59 The jury found in
favor of the plaintiff.60 Both the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit6 ' and the United States Supreme Court af-
firmed the judgment. 62
In Walker, the companion case to Curtis, a retired Army General
alleged that he was libeled by an Associated Press dispatch that
stated, incorrectly, that he had encouraged and incited rioting at
the University of Mississippi campus.° The jury returned a verdict
in favor of the plaintiff." The Texas Court of Civil Appeals af-
firmed the trial court's decision,65 but the United States Supreme
Court reversed."
In both cases, the Supreme Court held that the plaintiffs were
public figures,67 and that the New York Times standard of actual
malice would be extended to include public figures.° The Curtis
decision elicited four separate opinions, showing the first signs of
the split in the Court.69 Justice Harlan wrote a plurality opinion,
joined by Justices Clark, Stewart and Fortas. 7° Justice Harlan ad-
vocated a standard allowing recovery by a public figure upon a
52 388 U.S. at 137. The New York Times decision did not come down until after the trial.
Id.
" Id. at 138. The jury awarded Curtis $60,000 in general damages and $3,000,000 in
punitive damages. Id. The trial court, however, reduced the total amount of damages to
$460,000 by remittitur. Id.
51 Id. at 139.
52 Id. at 161.
68 Id. at 140.
64 Id, at 141. The jury awarded Curtis $500,000 in compensatory damages and $300,000
in punitive damages. Id. The trial court refused to enter the punitive award, finding that
there was no evidence presented to support a conclusion that there was actual malice. Id. at
141-42.
Id. at 142.
55 Id.
62 Id. at 155.
68 388 U.S. at 164 (Warren, C.J., concurring).
The Supreme Court also faced the question of whether punitive damages should be
limited to cases of actual malice. Id. at 160. The Court rejected this argument, asserting that
precedent did not suggest that there are different constitutional standards for compensatory
and punitive damages. Id. The Court thus held that conduct that is enough to justify
compensatory damages also justifies punitive damages. Id. at 161.
" Id. at 162 (Warren, C.J., concurring); id. at 170 (Black, J., dissenting in Curtis, concur-
ring in Walker); id. at 172 (Brennan, J., dissenting in Curtis, concurring in Walker). Justice
Harlan delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 133; see also Halpern, supra note 10, at 280-
81; Harry Kalven Jr., The Reasonable Man and the First Amendment: Hill, Butts, and Walker,
1967 SUP. CT. REV. 267, 275. Kalven stated that "you can't tell the players without a score
card." Id.
7° Curtis, 388 U.S. at 133.
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showing that the press had engaged in "highly unreasonable con-
duct" amounting to a grave departure from responsible journal-
ism. 7 ' Justice Harlan explained that factors that had been present
in the New York Times case, such as the analogy to seditious libel,
were not present in Curtis because the statements made in the latter
case did not arise from political expression.72 Thus, Justice Harlan
reasoned that public figures should be required to prove a standard
based on the press's highly unreasonable conduct rather than actual
malice."
Chief Justice Warren wrote a concurrence in which Justices
Black, Douglas, Brennan and White joined, thus providing a ma-
jority for the Court. 74 The Chief Justice argued that neither logic
nor the First Amendment justified the application of separate stan-
dards for public officials and public figures. 75 He further explained
that Justice Harlan's "highly unreasonable conduct" standard was
too uncertain and could not adequately protect free speech. 76 Chief
Justice Warren argued that the "blending of positions and power"
in modern society resulted in individuals who, though not elected
to public office, were nonetheless influential in deciding important
public issues.77 Therefore, he argued that the actual malice standard
articulated in New York Times was applicable to both public figures
and public officials. 78
Justice Black, joined by Justice Douglas, adhered to his position
in New York Times, arguing that the press is absolutely immune from
defamation actions. 79 Both Justices, however, joined the opinion of
Chief Justice Warren in order to decide the case based on the New
York Times precedent in the belief that if a line was going to be
drawn, at least it should be that of actual malice. 80 Justice Black
claimed that even the New York Times standard was incapable of
saving the media from being ruined by libel judgments. 81 Justice
71 /d. at 155.
77 /d. at 154.
73 Id. at 155.
74 Id. at 162.
"Id. at 163.
Id.
"Id. at 163-64.
m Id. at 164.
" Id. at 171-72.
"Id. at 170.
81 Id. at 171.
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Brennan, joined by Justice White, concurred with the Chief Justice's
extension of New York Times. 82
In 1970, when the United States Supreme Court in Rosenbloom
v. Metromedia, Inc. considered a libel action by a private figure, it
shifted the application of the New York Times standard from the
status of the plaintiff to whether the nature of the speech was of
public or general interest. 83 Five separate opinions emerged from
Rosenbloom, with no one opinion commanding more than three
votes." At least five Justices, however, held that the New York Times
actual malice standard should be required of private figures when
the statements published were of legitimate and general concern. 85
In Rosenbloom, police arrested a distributor of nudist magazines
for selling allegedly obscene material. 86 He then sued city and police
officials, claiming that the magazines were not obscene. 87 Radio
broadcasts of the arrests and trial, however, had labeled the maga-
zines obscene and characterized Rosenbloom as a "smut merchant"
and a "girlie-book peddler." 88 Rosenbloom filed a lawsuit alleging
that the broadcasts libeled him." The jury found in favor of Ro-
senbloom. 9° The United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit reversed the judgment, holding that the New York Times
standard applied, and that the fact that Rosenbloom was not a public
figure had no definitive significance. 9 ' The United States Supreme
Court affirmed the court of appeals decision.92
In a plurality opinion by Justice Brennan, the author of New
York Times, the Supreme Court expressed its continued commitment
to open and robust debate on public issues by expanding constitu-
tional protection to all discussion of matters of public or general
82 388 U.S. at 172. Justice Brennan wrote separately because he preferred to remand
Curtis for a new trial so that the jury could receive proper instructions to comply with the
New York Times standard. Id.
83 403 U.S. 29, 43-44 (1971).
" Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring); id. (White, J., concurring); id. at 62 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan announced the Court's judg-
ment. Id. at 30.
85 Id. at 43-44; id. at 59 (White, J., concurring).
" Id. at 32.
" Id, at 34.
88 Id. at 33-34.
89 Id. at 36.
99 Id. at 40. The jury awarded Rosenbloom $25,000 in general damages and $725,000
in punitive damages. Id.
91 Id.
92 Id. at 57.
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concern, regardless of whether the persons involved are "famous
or anonymous."93 The Court reasoned that the significance of a
public event does not diminish because a private person is in-
volved.94 The Court noted that a distinction between public and
private figures did not comport well with the First Amendment. 95
The Court explained that the New York Times actual malice standard
applied to both a public official and public figure in order to en-
courage the discussion of public issues, not because a public official's
interest in his or her reputation is any less important than that of
a private person. 96 The Court maintained that the individual's in-
terest in privacy is not present in a case such as this because the
individual is involved in issues of concern to the public.97
 Justice
Brennan stated that the reach of the phrase "issue of public or
general concern" would be left to future cases."
Rosenbloom resulted in four other opinions—two concurrences
and two dissents. 99 In a concurring opinion, Justice Black main-
tained his absolutist position that the First Amendment does not
permit libel judgments against the press.'°° In a separate opinion,
Justice White concurred in the judgment on a narrow ground.'"
He emphasized that the press has a First Amendment privilege to
report on official actions of public servants such as the police with
no need to spare the reputation of the persons involved from the
public. 102 Justice White thus held it unnecessary to reach broader
questions under the facts before the Court.' 93 Justice Harlan dis-
sented on the grounds that private individuals do not have the same
access to the media that public officials and public figures have, and
that they have not voluntarily placed themselves in public view.'"
Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented, arguing that
a standard of "matters of public concern" would mean that courts
93 Id. at 43-44.
94 Id. at 43.
9' 403 U.S. at 45-46.
96 1d. at 46.
97 Id. at 48.
99
 at 44-45.
ss Id. at 57 (Black, J., concurring); id. (White, J., concurring); id. at 62 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 78 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
'°° Id. at 57.
101 Id.
"12 Id. at 62.
los Id.
104 Id. at 70.
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would be left with the decision of what information is important to
self-government.' 05
The extension of the New York Times actual malice rule in Curtis
and Rosenbloom, while beneficial to the press, created confusion and
further complexity in defamation law. i°6 Curtis produced a curious
decision, in which Justice Harlan wrote for the Court, but where
the majority aligned—for differing reasons—with Chief Justice
Warren in holding that a public figure must prove actual malice to
prevail in a libel action. L° 7 After Curtis, the Court in Rosenbloom
attempted to resolve the remaining problem of whether constitu-
tional protection would be based on the nature of the speech or on
the status of the plaintiff by focusing on whether the statements
were about issues of general concern. 10' The resolution of Rosen-
bloom proved both unclear and short-lived. 109
B. 1974-76: Limiting Constitutional Protection
Four years later, the Supreme Court took a step back from New
York Times and Rosenbloom in the 1974 case of Gertz v. Robert Welch,
Inc."° The Court in Gertz rejected the Rosenbloom plurality's focus
on the nature of the speech and returned to a standard based on
the status of the plaintiff.'" The Supreme Court in Gertz held that
because the plaintiff was a private figure, there was no constitutional
requirement that the plaintiff show actual malice on the part of the
press." 2 The Court further held that states could define their own
standard in defamation cases involving private individuals, as long
as they did not impose liability without fault."'
The Gertz case arose after a Chicago police officer was convicted
of murder for killing a youth." 4 The victim's family hired Gertz,
an attorney, to represent them in civil litigation against the officer." 5
While representing the family, Gertz was the subject of an article
10 403 U.S. at 79.
'm See Halpern, supra note 10, at 280,283.
107 /d. at 280-81.
ma Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43-44; id. at 59 (White, J., concurring).
log See Halpern, supra note 10, at 283.
"0 418 U.S. 323,347 (1974).
Id. at 346-47.
112 Id. at 347.
"5 /d.
"4 Id. at 325.
"5/d.
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by American Opinion, a magazine published by Robert Welch, Inc.
that expressed the views of the John Birch Society." 6 The article
alerted readers of a national Communist conspiracy to discredit
local law enforcement agencies.t t' Although Gertz was not involved
in the criminal prosecution of the officer, the magazine implied that
he was behind the frame-up, that he had a criminal record and that
he was a "Communist-fronter."" 8 Although the jury found for
Gertz, the court entered judgment for Robert Welch notwithstand-
ing the verdict, holding that New York Times governed the case." 9
The United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit af-
firmed the judgment, holding that although Gertz was not a public
figure, he was involved in an issue of public interest, and thus under
Rosenbloom, the actual malice standard was indeed applicable.' 2°
The Supreme Court, parting with Rosenbloom, reversed the Sev-
enth Circuit's judgment."' This time, the members of the Court
wrote six separate opinions.' 22 Justice Powell, who delivered the
opinion of the Court, began with the often-cited dictum that there
can be no false ideas under the First Amendment, regardless of
how damaging an opinion may appear.' 23 Justice Powell stated,
however, that there was no constitutional protection per se for false
factual statements.' 24 Nonetheless, the Court explained that because
such false statements of fact were unavoidable in unrestricted de-
bate, the First Amendment thus required protection of some falsity
in order to properly protect "speech that matters." 125
The Supreme Court emphasized that the state interest in com-
pensating private individuals for injury to reputation called for a
different rule to apply to them as opposed to public figures.' 26 The
Court based its opinion on two main rationales, the first of which
118 Id.
" 7 Id.
118 Id. at 326.
H 9 /d. at 329.
12° Id. at 330-31,332.
121
 Id. at 332.
122 418 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 354 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id.
at 355 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 361 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 369 (White, J.,
dissenting). Justice Powell delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 325.
128 Id. at 339. The Supreme Court in Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695
(1990), later rejected the argument that the Gertz Court intended to create an opinion
exemption to libel. Id. at 2705. Instead, the Milkovich Court recharacterized Justice Powell's
phrase as dictum. Id.
124 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 340.
125 Id. at 340-41.
126 Id. at 343.
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is the extent of an individual's capacity to resort to self-help, such
as making public corrections, after being defamed. 127 The Court
pointed out that public officials and public figures have greater
access to the media and therefore possess more opportunities to
rebut false statements than do private individuals.' 28 Because pri-
vate individuals are thus more vulnerable to injury due to their
inability to redress the injury through the media, the state has a
greater interest in protecting them.' 29
The second rationale on which the Court based its public/
private distinction is that of the individual's willingness and efforts
to cast him or herself in the spotlight.' 30 The Court first made a
distinction between two kinds of public figures.' 3 ' According to the
Court, the first type are those public figures who occupy such im-
portant positions in society that they are classified as public figures
for all purposes.'32 The second type, which the Court noted are
more common, are those public figures who are in the spotlight in
regard to a particular issue.'" In both situations, however, the Court
said these individuals attract attention.' 34
 The Court further ex-
plained that both public officials and public figures have voluntarily
exposed themselves to greater risk by assuming their positions." 5
The Court reasoned, however, that private individuals do not de-
liberately subject themselves to any risk.' 36 The Court thus con-
cluded that the Constitution does not require private individuals to
prove actual malice in libel cases.'" The Court then held that states
themselves could determine a standard of liability as long as they
did not impose liability without fault.' 38
122 Id. at 344.
128 id,
122 Id.
13°
 Id. at 345.
" I Id.
I22 Id.
3 " Id.
'" Id.
"5 418 U.S. at 345.
126 Id.
17 Id. at 347.
In Id. The Gertz Court further held that states could not allow recovery of punitive
damages if liability was not based on actual malice. Id. at 349. The Supreme Court reasoned
that the state interest in redressing the wrongs done to private individuals did not extend
further than compensation for actual injury. Id. at 348-49. Moreover, the Court explained
that because punitive damages allow juries full discretion to award damages where there has
been no injury, they can interfere with the First Amendment and lure juries into punishing
the media for unpopular opinion even where the plaintiff has not suffered any injury. Id. at
349.
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In a concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun stated that the pre-
Rosenbloom doctrine focusing on the status of the plaintiff greatly
limited New York Times by allowing states to define their own stan-
dards of liability in a greater number of cases.'" Justice Blackmun
noted that although he preferred the view of the Rosenbloom plu-
rality, which extended the New York Times actual malice to cases in
which the speech was on matters of general concern, he joined the
Court's opinion to form a majority.'" Justice Blackmun explained
that he thought the area of defamation needed a clearly defined
majority instead of the uncertainty that followed Rosenbloom."'
The four dissenters in Gertz—Chief Justice Burger and Justices
Douglas, Brennan and White—each offered a separate rationale for
his decision.' 42 Justice Douglas held fast to his absolutist position
that state libel suits for the discussion of public issues did not com-
port with the guarantees of the First Amendment. 143 Justice Bren-
nan reiterated his position in Rosenbloom, stating his belief that the
New York Times standard was applicable in all matters of general
interest.'" Chief Justice Burger, on the other hand, recommended
the use of caution and preferred to let the area of law continue to
evolve as it had with respect to private citizens.' 45 Finally, Justice
White stated his disagreement with the Court's interference in the
states' interest in protecting individuals from defamation. 146 He
stressed that New York Times created only limited exceptions to the
general rule that libelous statements are not protected by the First
Amendment.' 47 Justice White argued that by using the First Amend-
ment as a tool, the Court nevertheless had nationalized libel law
and declared unconstitutional the laws in most states.' 48
"9 Id. at 353. Justice Blackmun also stressed his agreement with the removal of punitive
damages in cases with a lower standard than actual malice. Id. at 354. Justice Blackmun stated
that "[My removing the specters of presumed and punitive damages in the absence of New
York Times malice, the Court eliminates significant and powerful motives for self-censorship
that otherwise are present in the traditional libel action." Id. Thus he stated that the removal
of presumed damages allows for the existence of a free press. Id.
"9 418 U.S. at 354.
141 Id.
"2 Id. at 354 (Burger, C.J., dissenting); id. at 355 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 361
(Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 369 (White, J., dissenting).
'4' Id. at 358.
' 44 Id. at 361.
145 Id. at 355.
' 46 Id. at 370.
"9 Id.
14B Id.
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Although most constitutional scholars characterize Gertz as a
press defeat, the decision has also been defended. 149 One commen-
tator suggests that the problem is not with the Gertz holding as to
private plaintiffs, but rather with determining how to treat public
figures.'" Although a definitive answer to the problem of public
figures may not exist, this commentator argues that an examination
of the nature of the speech—which Gertz eliminated from its test-
is essential to determine whether or not speech is constitutionally
protected.' 5 I
The United States Supreme Court continued to refine its dis-
tinction between public and private figures in the 1976 case of Time,
Inc. v. Firestone. 152 In Time, the Court held that the plaintiff, a
prominent Palm Beach socialite involved in a well-publicized di-
vorce, was not a public figure.'" The Supreme Court stated that a
divorce was not the type of public controversy, as defined in Gertz,
which transforms a private person into a public figure. 154
The Time case arose from the divorce of Mary Alice Firestone
from her wealthy husband.' 55 After Firestone filed a separation
complaint, her husband filed a counterclaim for divorce on the
grounds of adultery and extreme cruelty.'" A judge granted the
divorce in a broadly-worded decree. 157 Time magazine ran an article
reporting the divorce and stating that the reasons for it had been
adultery and extreme cruelty. 158
 At trial, Firestone prevailed in her
libel action against Time, Inc.'"
149
 For criticism of Gertz, see, e.g., David A. Anderson, Libel and Press Self-Censorship, 53
TEX. L. REV. 422, 441 (1975) (decision promotes self-censorship); Gerald G. Ashdown, Gertz
and Firestone: A Study in Constitutional Policy-Malting, 61 MINN. L. REV. 645, 661 (1977)
(treatment given to private plaintiffs unjustifiable and protection to press illusive); George
C. Christie, Underlying Contradictions in the Supreme Court's Classification of Defamation, 1981
DUKE L.J. 811, 821 (Court should adopt uniform standards in defamation). In defense of
Gertz, see, e.g., David N. Robertson, Defamation and the First Amendment: In Praise of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEX. L. REV. 199, 200-01 (1976) (sensible compromise between First
Amendment and privacy interests); Lewis, supra note 37, at 622 (balance of interests in Gertz
correct but Court should have kept subject matter in test).
0° Lewis, supra note 37, at 622.
151 Id. at 624.
" 2 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976).
In Id.
154 Id, at 454.
155 /d. at 450.
156 hi.
1 " Id. at 450-51.
' Mi ld. at 451-52.
' 55
 Id. at 452. A jury awarded Firestone $100,000. Id. The judgment was affirmed by
both the Florida District Court of Appeal and the Supreme Court of Florida. Id.
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In an opinion authored by then-Associate Justice Rehnquist,
the Supreme Court stated that Firestone was not a public figure
because she did not accept any prominent role in society or launch
herself to the vanguard of a public debate.' 6° The Court explained
that making Firestone a public figure only because her divorce was
of public interest would mean a return to the Rosenbloom doctrine
of extending New York Times to any matters of general concern.' 61
The Court reasoned that the subject-matter test of Rosenbloom did
not strike a proper balance in the area of libel.' 62 The Court ex-
plained that the Gertz Court had discarded the Rosenbloom doctrine
because it severely restricted a state's legitimate interest in compen-
sating individuals who are injured by defamatory statements. 163
Once again, the Supreme Court did not stand behind a unan-
imous opinion. 164 Justice Powell's concurrence argued that there
was no evidence that the lower court ever applied a fault standard,
which he stated was contrary to Gertz's holding that states must use
some degree of fault in order to impose liability. 165
 In his dissent,
Justice Brennan acknowledged that although Gertz had meant a step
back from Rosenbloom, it had not overruled the latter decision. 166
Justice Brennan argued that Gertz did not change Rosenbloom's es-
sential holding that when there are errors in reporting on actions
of public officials the New York Times malice standard must be met
to impose liability. 167
 He argued that because Time involved the
reporting of judicial affairs, the plaintiff was required to prove
actual malice to recover.' 68
Justice White, on the other hand, dissented because he would
have affirmed the decision of the trial court.' 66 Justice White rea-
soned that using the fault standards in either Gertz or Rosenbloom in
Firestone's case would not further First Amendment values.'" He
' 6° Id. at 953.
'5 ' Id. at 454.
'52 429 U.S. at 456.
16!
	 The Supreme Court remanded the case because there was not a finding of fault
in the record, which the Court stated was necessary under Gertz for awarding compensatory
damages. Id. at 464.
164 Id. (Powell, J., concurring); id. at 471 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 481 (White, J.,
dissenting); id. at 484 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
165 Id. at 464-65 (Powell, J., concurring).
"Id. at 474, 476 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
' 67 /d. at 476.
' 68 Id. at 476, 481.
169 Id. at 481 (White, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 481-82.
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explained that because the publication of the Time article predated
both Gertz and Rosenbloom, requiring fault in this case only interfered
with the state's interest in redressing the wrong to a victim of
defamation.' 7 ' Moreover, Justice White concluded that, in any
event, the trial court properly determined fault.' 72 Justice Marshall's
dissent concentrated on the meaning of public figure.'" He pointed
out that Firestone was prominent among the "400" of Palm Beach
society, was a member of the "sporting set," and had held press
conferences during her trial.'" Justice Marshall concluded that
Firestone was a public figure and thus that an application of the
New York Times standard of actual malice was warranted in this
case.' 75
After Time, the Supreme Court had taken two steps away from
the constitutional protection established just two years before in
Rosenbloom.' 76 The Court—in Gertz and Time—held that both a
prominent lawyer and a Palm Beach socialite were private plain-
tiffs.'" The Supreme Court had returned to a constitutional stan-
dard based on the status of the plaintiff rather than one based on
the nature of the speech.'"
C. Emerging Procedural Protections
Twenty years after New York Times, the United States Supreme
Court began to deal with a series of libel cases that presented the
press with an opportunity to argue for increased procedural safe-
guards.'" In 1984, the Court was faced with a procedural question
of first impression in Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc.'" In Bose, the Court had to decide whether the "clearly erro-
neous" standard of review prescribed by Rule 52(a) of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure is applicable in reviewing a determination
' 7 ' Id. at 483.
172
 424 U.S. at 482.
176 Id. at 484 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
174 Id. at 484-85.
176 Id. at 485.
176 See supra notes 83-109 and accompanying text for a discussion of Rosenbloom.
en Time, 424 U.S. 448, 455 (1976); Gertz, 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974).
178 See Time, 424 U.S. at 455 (plaintiff is not a public figure although her divorce may be
of interest to the public); Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352 (lawyer who represented private client and
never spoke to press is not a public figure).
176
 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986); Philadelphia Newsp., Inc.
v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States,
Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 514 (1984).
180 466 U.S. at 487.
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of actual malice as defined in New York Times.ull The Supreme Court
held that an appellate court must conduct an independent review
to determine whether the evidence establishes actual malice with
clear and convincing evidence in a case governed by New York
Times.' 82
The controversy in Bose arose after Consumer Reports magazine,
published by Consumers Union, evaluated a loudspeaker manufac-
tured by Bose in a feature article on different brands of speakers.'"
Bose was unhappy with the article and brought a product dispar-
agement lawsuit.'" The lower court found that Bose was a public
figure as defined by Gertz, and that Bose had met its burden of
proving actual malice.' 85 The United States Court of Appeals for
the First Circuit reversed the lower court judgment.'" The court
of appeals stated that Rule 52(a)'s "clearly erroneous" standard of
review was not a limitation to its review of the actual malice find-
ing. 187 Furthermore, the court of appeals held that it was required
to undertake a de novo review of the record to safeguard the lower
court's application of the constitutional standard.' 88 The United
States Supreme Court affirmed the court of appeals decision.' 89
Writing for a majority of the Court, Justice Stevens noted in
Bose that Rule 52(a) applies to the review of findings of fact and
not to findings of law or mixed questions of law and fact.'" The
Court also pointed out that in New York Times, it had acknowledged
the necessity of an independent review for determinations of con-
stitutional issues. 19 ' Thus, the Court held that in a case governed
by New York Times, an appellate court must conduct an independent
review to determine whether the evidence establishes actual malice
with convincing clarity.' 92
161 Id. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 52(a) provides: "Findings of fact ... shall not be
set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of the
trial court to judge of the credibility of the witnesses." FED. R. Qv. P. 52(a).
182 466 U.S. at 514.
183 Id. at 487.
164 Id. at 488.
'" Id. at 489-90, 491.
"6 Id. at 491,
" 7 Id. at 492.
"6 Id,
189 1d. at 514.
190 1d. at 501.
' 51 466 U.S. at 508 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964)).
in Neu, York Times, the Supreme Court stated, "We must 'make an independent examination
of the whole record' so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a
forbidden intrusion on the field of free expression." 376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964).
192 Bose, 466 U.S. at 514.
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In a one-paragraph dissent, Justice White argued that the ac-
tual knowledge of falsity component of the New York Times standard,
which was decisive in this case, is a question of historical fact not
entitled to de novo review.'" Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice
O'Connor, elaborated on this distinction in his dissent.'" Justice
Rehnquist explained that the lower court relied on the writer's
credibility in deciding that the defamatory statement was written
with actual knowledge of its falsity.' 95 The writer's credibility, ac-
cording to Justice Rehnquist, was a question of fact upon which an
appellate court should not make a determination.'" Moreover, Jus-
tice Rehnquist analogized to other areas where appellate courts have
conducted only deferential review, such as in criminal cases, where
the burden of proof is greater than under New York Times. 197
Two years later, in the 1986 case of Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc.
v. Hepps, a divided Court decided yet another procedural question—
this time involving the burden of proof for libel plaintiffs.'" The
Supreme Court in Hepps held that in suing a newspaper for libel
regarding "speech of public concern," a private figure must prove
the falsity of the statement. 199 The Court ruled that the constitu-
tional requirements in libel cases supplant the common law's pre-
sumption of falsity. 20°
In Hepps, the Philadelphia Inquirer, owned by Philadelphia News-
papers, ran a series of five articles alleging that the plaintiff, the
principal stockholder of a large franchise corporation, was con-
nected to organized crime and had used those connections to influ-
ence the state's governmental processes. 201 Hepps brought a defa-
mation suit against the newspaper company.202 The jury ruled
against Hepps, finding that he had not proved the falsity of the
statements.205 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court reversed, holding
193 /d. at 515.
' 94 1d.
195 Id. at 516.
19° Id. at 519.
197 Id. at 517.
199 475 U.S. 767, 768-69 (1986).
199 Id. at 768-69. Commentators have noted that the Supreme Court's decision departed
from the structure set out in Gertz and left open the burden of proof required for private
plaintiffs suing for libel for speech of private concern. See Halpern, supra note 10, at 290;
Rodney A. Smolla, Dun & Bradstreet, Hepps, and Liberty Lobby: A New Analytic Primer on
the Future Course of Defamation, 75 GEO. L.J. 1519, 1525 (1987).
299 Hepps, 475 U.S. at 775.
201 1d. at 769.
'°' Id. at 770.
2°3 1d. at 770-71.
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that falsity was not part of a plaintiff's burden of proof. 204 The
United States Supreme Court reversed the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court judgment. 205
The United States Supreme Court explained that under the
common law, the defendant has the burden of proving the truth of
the defamatory statement because its falsity is presumed. 206 Under
New York Times, however, the Court noted that a public figure or
public official must prove falsity to meet the actual malice stan-
dard."' Writing for the Court, Justice O'Connor explained that
when the plaintiff is a private figure, but the speech is of public
concern, constitutional requirements, though less demanding in
such a situation, do replace the common law. 208 The Court once
again declared that its ruling was necessary to give the First Amend-
ment its needed "breathing space." 209 The Court explained that the
speech was related to the effectiveness of the political process and,
as such, the First Amendment required protection of the speech. 2 m
Moreover, the Court noted that the decision did not add much to
the plaintiff's actual burden because in most cases, proof of fault
will encompass proof of falsity. 2 "
Justice Stevens, joined by Chief Justice Burger, Justice White
and Justice Rehnquist, dissented from the Court's opinion. 212 Justice
Stevens argued that the ruling did little to help the First Amend-
ment. 2 " Justice Stevens stated that his major point of disagreement
was that the Court had given too little weight to the state's interest
in protecting private persons from injury to their reputations 2i 4
Furthermore, Justice Stevens contended that the Court's decision
only protected publishers who act negligently or recklessly by print-
ing statements that cannot objectively be proven true.215
Just two months after Hepps, the Supreme Court faced another
procedural dilemma in deciding the appropriate standard to be
2°4 Id. at 771.
2°5 Id.
206 1d. at 770.
207 1d. at 775.
218 Id. The Supreme Court did not make clear what the burden of proof would be if the
speech involved an issue of public concern. See Smolla, supra note 199, at 1526.
Hepps, 475 U.S. at 778 (citing New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 272
(1964)).
510 1d.
su Id.
212 Id. at 780 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
213 /d. at 782.
214 Id. at 781.
416 Id. at 785.
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used at the summary judgment phase in libel cases in Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, hic. 216 The Court remained divided, but the lines were
redrawn. 217 The Court in Anderson held that a court must apply the
"clear and convincing" standard used in cases governed by New York
Times when ruling on a motion for summary judgment in order to
determine whether actual malice exists. 2 's
In Anderson, Liberty Lobby, a self-proclaimed citizens' lobby,
filed a libel action against publisher Jack Anderson in response to
two articles that appeared in The Investigator magazine, which por-
trayed the group as racist, anti-Semitic and fascist. 219 The lower
court granted Anderson's motion for summary judgment. 22° The
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia af-
firmed the district court judgment as to most of the defamatory
statements and held that, at the summary judgment stage, the re-
quirement of clear and convincing evidence to prove actual malice
was not relevant. 22 ' The court of appeals stated that it would not
impose a higher burden than the usual preponderance of the evi-
dence at summary judgment. 222
The United States Supreme Court reversed the lower court
decision,223 holding that the clear and convincing evidentiary bur-
den must be used in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 224
The Supreme Court explained that at the summary judgment
phase, a judge should not weigh the evidence to determine truth,
but rather to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial
under Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.223 In an
opinion written by Justice White, the Court stated that ruling on a
summary judgment motion must involve the same evidentiary stan-
dard of proof that is applicable at trial. 226 Justice White explained
that a judge must determine whether there is evidence to support
a jury's finding for the plaintiff. 227 The Court reasoned that if the
216 477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986).
417 Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 268 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice White
delivered the opinion of the Court. Id. at 244.
218 Id. at 257.
"9 Id. at 244-45.
2s°
	 at 246.
"I Id. at 246-47.
"s Id. at 247.
723 Id. at 244.
r24 477 U.S. at 257.
225 Id. at 249.
229 1d. at 252.
227 Id.
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clear and convincing standard is required by the First Amendment,
then the judge must determine whether the evidence proves actual
malice with convincing clarity. 228 The Court thus concluded that for
a judge to determine whether a jury could find for the plaintiff
required an examination of the criteria by which the jury would
make that decision. 229
The Anderson case elicited two dissents: one by Justice Brennan
and the other by Justice Rehnquist. 23° Justice Brennan noted that
he was primarily disturbed by the Court's "deeply flawed" analy-
sis."' He argued that the decision changed the summary judgment
ruling for all cases, including those outside of libel, and that the
Court had not explained how a trial court should consider eviden-
tiary standards in ruling on a motion for summary judgment. 232 In
a separate dissent, Justice Rehnquist explained the Court's opinion
as motivated by "concerns for intellectual tidiness." 2" Justice Rehn-
quist argued that the Court's decision was contrary to a prior case
in which the Court had declined to give libel defendants any "special
procedural protections."234 Justice Rehnquist again turned to crim-
inal law for an example to show the inconsistency in the Court's
ruling.235 He pointed out that although the standard for guilt in
criminal trials is that of "clear beyond a reasonable doubt," the
standard for deciding whether a case should go to trial is only that
of "probable cause." 238 Justice Rehnquist thus disagreed with the
creation of a different standard for ruling on summary judgment
in libel cases. 237
Of these three procedural cases decided between 1984 and
1986, the greatest victory for the press—and one that caught many
by surprise—came with the Supreme Court's decision in Hepps. 238
" Id. The Court stated that a judge "must view the evidence presented through the
prism of the substantive evidentiary burden." Id. at 254.
2" Id.
22G Id. at 257 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id, at 268 (Rehnquist. J., dissenting).
231 Id. at 257.
292
	 at 257-58 n.L
”3 /d. at 268 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Justice Rehnquist criticized the Court's opinion
for sounding like a "treatise about cooking by someone who has never cooked before and
has no intention of starting now." Id. at 269.
224 Id. (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)).
235 /d. at 272.
236 Id. at 271-72.
/d. at 273.
"' John V.R. Bull, Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps: New Hope for Preserving
Freedom of the Press, 38 MERCER L. REV. 785, 787 (1987); Smolla, supra note 199, at 1525.
One writer states that Hepps marked a "major consolidation of past gains for the press."
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One journalist asserts that Hepps could reverse the chilling effect
produced by libel suits. 239 On the other hand, one commentator;
Rodney Smolla, concedes that while Hepps and Anderson are both
significant press victories, the possibility that the cases can be read
narrowly throws libel law into a state of uncertainty. 24° Smolla con-
tends that Hepps's holding was narrow on two grounds: first, because
the Court declined to decide the extent of the burden of falsity a
private plaintiff must present; and second, because the Court, point-
ing out that the Philadelphia Inquirer was a media defendant, did not
decide whether the same rule applied to nonmedia defendants."'
Smolla further argued that while Anderson was also a press victory,
the Court decided it on procedural grounds and gave limited atten-
tion to the First Amendment. 242 According to Smolla, after Anderson,
the prediction of future outcomes in libel cases is nearly impossi-
ble.243
II. LOWER COURT LIBEL OPINIONS OF NEWER JUSTICES
Three of the most recently appointed Justices to the Supreme
Court Justices Scalia, Kennedy and Souter244—all appointed
within the past six years, have not extensively participated or written
opinions in libel cases. While on the Supreme Court, Justice Scalia
has voted in four print media libel cases, but has written only one
concurrence during that time. 245 Justice Kennedy has voted in three
such cases, authoring one majority opinion. 246 Finally, Justice Sau-
ter, who voted in one libel case, has not authored any print media
Richard Tofel, Reagan's Appointees Offer Some Surprises in Their Libel Views, LEGAL TIMES, May
18, 1987, at 18.
"' Bull, supra note 238, at 785.
Smolla, supra note 199, at 1522.
5" Id. at 1525. The previous year, the Court decided Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss
Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749 (1985), a defamation suit between two private parties. The Court
continued its media/non media distinction and held that speech not involving matters of
public concern had lessened constitutional protection. Thus, a state could award both pre-
sumed and punitive damages without a showing of actual malice. Id. at 761.
"5 Smolla, supra note 199, at 1532.
" 5 1d. at 1523.
" 4 Justice Clarence Thomas is omitted from this discussion. Although it would be helpful
to know his proclivity in libel cases, he did not author any libel opinions during his tenure
on the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.
"5 See Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 696 (1989)
(Scalia, J., concurring).
"6 Set Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 111  S. Ct. 2419 (1991). Justice Kennedy also
wrote a one-sentence concurrence in three-Hanks. 491 U.S. at 696.
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opinions since his appointment. 247 Because relatively less is known
about the libel law views of these newer Justices, this Note will
examine the opinions that each wrote before their appointments to
the Supreme Court.
Justice Scalia took his oath as an Associate Justice of the United
States Supreme Court on September 26, 1986. 248 He had served for
four years as a circuit judge on the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia. 249 In that time, he authored
two opinions—a majority and a dissent—in the area of libel law. 25°
Then-Judge Scalia first expressed his views on libel in the 1984
case of Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson. 25 ' Judge Scalia rejected the
theory of the libel-proof plaintiff that an allegation is not actionable
if it has been repeated before. 252 Judge Scalia also concluded that
the "clear and convincing" evidentiary burden of proof required in
libel cases is not relevant in a determination of summary judg-
ment.255 Furthermore, Judge Scalia reversed the summary judg-
ment granted to defendants in regard to nine of the thirty allega-
tions in dispute. 254
Judge Scalia first declined to adopt the theory that the plaintiff
was libel-proof. 255 The defendant argued that the plaintiff's repu-
tation had been irreparably harmed by the prior publication of
similar articles, and thus a libel judgment could not provide com-
pensation for injury to reputation when there was no injury. 256
Judge Scalia asserted that the repetition of a statement does not
make it true. 257 He explained that First Amendment values would
not be served because if someone has been libeled by other sources,
the defendant's good faith reliance on those sources is a complete
defense.258
2" Justice Souter voted with the majority in Masion. See 111 S. Ct. at 2419.
2" Stuart Taylor, Jr., Rehnquist and Scalia Take Their Places on Court, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
27, 1986, at 8.
m Id.
2" Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Liberty
Lobby, lnc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
2s'
	 Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1565. See supra notes 216-37 and accompanying text for a
discussion of the Supreme Court decision:
222 Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1568.
222
	 at 1570.
224 Id. at 1577. Judge Scalia affirmed the granting of summary judgment for the re-
maining twenty-one allegations. Id. For a discussion of the facts, see also supra note 219 and
accompanying text.
222 Id. at 1568.
222 Id,
257
2.511
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Judge Scalia then faced the question of the appropriate burden
of proof at the summary judgment phase of a libel action. 259 He
reasoned that the imposition of the convincing clarity standard
would change the summary judgment process from one that deter-
mines whether there are minimum facts to support a plaintiff's case
to one where those facts are evaluated. 260 Judge Scalia made the
analogy to criminal cases where although "beyond a reasonable
doubt" is the standard at trial, "probable cause" is sufficient to
proceed to tria1. 26 ' Thus, he held that the standard of convincing
clarity was applicable only after the plaintiff presented his or her
evidence. 262
Judge Scalia then turned to a discussion of the merits. 263 First,
he determined that some of the allegations were not defamatory
because they were simply charges of "journalistic inaccuracy."264
Next, Judge Scalia held that other allegations were constitutionally
protected opinion under Gertz:265 He relied largely on the context
in which the statements. were made to determine that these were
opinion. 266 Furthermore, Judge Scalia held that those statements
that the defendant made in reliance on published reports in reput-
able sources and interviews could not have been made with actual
malice.267
The nine statements for which Judge Scalia reversed the grant
of summary judgment had originated from a previous magazine
article. 268 That article, however, had been the subject of a libel action
by Liberty Lobby that was eventually settled out of court. 269 Judge
Scalia explained that it was likely that either the writer or one of
239 Id. at 1570.
260 Id.
28 ' Id. at 1570-71. Judge Scalia used the same analogy to criminal law that Justice
Rehnquist later used when Liberty Lobby reached the Supreme Court. See supra notes 235-37
and accompanying text.
262 Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1571.
263 Id. at 1572.
264 Id. These included statements such as that Liberty Lobby's magazine "boasts 335,000
readers," when in fact it had a paid circulation of 335,000. Id.
263 Id. He also quoted the dictum from Gertz that there is no such thing as a false idea.
Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1572 (citing Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339 (1974)).
In determining whether the statements were opinion, Judge Scalia closely examined them
and concluded that all the terms used could have different meanings to different people. Id.
at 1573.
266 id.
267
 Id. at 1575-77.
268 /d. at 1578.
469 Id,
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the editors would have been aware of this prior action. 270 Thus,
Judge Scalia concluded that a reasonable jury could find that those
nine statements were made with actual malice. 27 '
The only other print media libel case before the District of
Columbia Circuit in which Judge Scalia authored an opinion—this
time a dissent—was the 1984 case of Oilman v. Evans. 272
 The majority
held that the statements in dispute were opinion protected by the
First Amendment. 275
 Judge Scalia, in dissent, argued that past cases
already provided sufficient protection to political statements without
the need to create a distinction between fact and opinion. 274
Oilman arose after Rowland Evans and Robert Novak, two syn-
dicated columnists, published an article about a New York Univer-
sity political science professor, Bertell Oilman, entitled "The Marxist
Professor's Intentions." 275 Oilman alleged that the article was false
and defamatory.276 The lower court granted the defendants' motion
for summary judgment. 277
The Oilman majority explained that the totality of the circum-
stances had to be examined in order to determine whether state-
ments were entitled to constitutional protection as opinion.278 In
order to do this, the court articulated four factors that required
examination: 279
 the common usage of the language of the state-
ment; the verifiability of the statement; the context in which the
statement was made; and the broader context in which the state-
ment arose.28° In applying this test to the facts, the majority con-
cluded that the statements were protected opinion. 281
Judge Scalia disagreed with the affirmance of summary judg-
ment as to only one statement that discussed 011man's professional
reputation. 282
 He first argued that existing doctrine already pro-
279 Id,
271 Id.
"2
 750 F.2d 970, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
273
 Id. at 971.
274
 Id. at 1036.
275
 Id. at 971.
276 M. at 973 n.l.
277 Id.
m Id. at 979.
279 Id.
"° Id.
Id. at 971.
9"
 750 F.2d at 1036. The columnists had quoted another professor as saying, "Oilman
has no status within the profession but is a pure and simple activist." Id. at 989.
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tected political hyperbole, which the statement was not. 283
 Second,
he explained that the New York Times requirement of actual malice
already accounted for the fact that those who enter the public arena
would be subject to "public bumping." 284
 Next, Judge Scalia count-
ered that the problem of the tendency of juries to find for plaintiffs
is resolved by the requirement that appellate courts independently
review the entire record as required by Bose. 285
 Thus, Judge Scalia
concluded that all valid concerns had been addressed by First
Amendment jurisprudence. 286
Judge Scalia argued that the statement in question could not
be regarded as the opinion of the columnists because it stated that
011man's colleagues found him to be incompetent.287 He stated that
the court's approach was one of "judicial subjectivity." 288 Moreover,
he asserted that if libel suits are becoming too much of a "modern
problem," then it is for the legislature, not the courts, to resolve. 289
The second of the newer appointees, Justice Kennedy, took his
seat on the Supreme Court on February 18, 1988. 290
 Since 1976, he
had been a circuit judge on the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. 29 ' During this time, he only authored
one libel opinion. 292
Then-Judge Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in the 1978
case of Church of Scientology of California v. Adams. 295 Judge Kennedy
affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the case for lack of personal
jurisdiction.294
 The case arose after two writers published five arti-
cles about Scientology in the St. Louis Post-Dispatch. 295 The articles,
sea
	 at 1036. Judge Scalia stated that the statement would have been hyperbole if the
columnists called Oilman a "traitor to our nation." Id.
284 Id.
2g,5 Id. at 1037 (quoting Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S.
485, 511 (1984)).
256m.
say
222 Id. at 1038.
2" Id. He criticized the court's alteration of doctrine by stating, "The principle that the
first amendment does not protect the deliberate impugning of character or reputation .
is to be revised to permit 'bumping . . . because we perceive that libel suits are now too
common and too successful." Id. at n.2.
t" Kennedy Begins Work as Supreme Court Justice, UPI, Feb. 19, 1988, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, UPI File.
291 Id.
r2 Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 895 (9th Cir. 1978).
'' Id.
224 Id.
222 Id.
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which centered on the Missouri Church of Scientology, were written
in St. Louis and made no mention of the California church. 296
Nevertheless, the California church filed a libel action in a California
court."'
Judge Kennedy concluded that California did not have juris-
diction over the defendants. 298
 He first explained that neither the
newspaper's revenues from California advertisers-2.91 percent of
its total revenues—nor its ownership of stock in a California com-
pany could be an adequate basis for jurisdiction because both were
unrelated to the libel action.299
 Thus, Judge Kennedy reasoned that
the only contact between the defendants and California was the
distribution of about 150 copies of the articles in dispute. 3°°
Judge Kennedy explained that the standard applied in other
cases to determine jurisdiction, that of the likelihood of the product
entering the forum, was not a fair standard in libel actions."' He
stated that due to the press's nature, it is likely that copies of its
publications will be located throughout the world. 302
 Judge Kennedy
reasoned that it would be unfair to submit publishers to personal
jurisdiction simply because a few of their publications entered the
forum state. 303
 Judge Kennedy held that the appropriate standard
in defamation cases was whether or not a risk of injury by libel
could foreseeably arise in the foruni state. 304
 He concluded that it
was not reasonably foreseeable in the present case that a risk of
injury by defamation would arise from the minimal circulation in
California. 3°3
The third of the more recent appointees, Justice Souter, took
his oath as Associate Justice of the Supreme Court on October 9,
1990. 3°6
 In April of 1990, President George Bush had appointed
Souter, a former New Hampshire Attorney General and New
"6 Id.
"7 Id.
"6 Id. at 899.
"9 Id. at 896-97.
3°° Id. at 897.
3°1 Id.
3°2 Id.
3°3 Id.
3°' Id. at 897-98.
3°3 1d. at 898. Judge Kennedy also stated that although the court did not need to reach
the merits of the case, it was doubtful that the California church had established a proper
claim because there was a difficult question as to whether the articles were "of and concerning"
the California church. Id.
306 Greg Henderson, Sauter Takes Seat on High Court, UPI, Oct. 10, 1990, available in
LEXIS, Nexis Library, UPI File.
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Hampshire Supreme Court justice, to the United States Court of
Appeals for the First Circuit." 7 Although Souter did not write any
libel opinions during his short tenure on the First Circuit, he did
author three such opinions while serving on the New Hampshire
Supreme Court.508
Justice Souter's first libel opinion came in the 1984 case of
Duchesnaye v. Munro Enterprises, Inc. 309 Justice Souter affirmed a
verdict for the plaintiff for an allegedly libelous editoria1. 31 ° The
lawsuit arose after the Berlin Reporter published a news article and
an editorial on harassing phone calls. 3 " The basis of the front-page
news story was the plaintiff's conviction for making annoying phone
calls. 312 The article writer learned from the police that the plaintiff
never spoke during his phone calls. 3 " The editorial, written by a
different author, discussed both obscene and harassing phone
calls. 314 The editorial writer then described the plaintiff as being
the kind of "unstable person" who made such calls. 315 The plaintiff
then brought the libel action. 318 The lower court granted summary
judgment for the defendants based on the news story. 317 At trial,
the court returned a verdict for the plaintiff based on the defa-
matory content of the editoria1. 3 ' 8
Justice Souter first determined that a statement of opinion can
be read to imply defamatory facts and, if so, it is actionable. 319
Although Justice Souter stated that there was no evidence in the
record to indicate that anyone had read the editorial to imply def-
amatory facts, he determined that the court had based liability on
other grounds. 320 Justice Souter stated that the trial court had found
the defendants liable because the editorial could be understood to
identify the plaintiff as an obscene caller."'
"7 Id.
aoe Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1197 (N.H. 1988) (Souter, J., dissenting);
Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp., 498 A.2d 348, 349 (N.H. 1985); Duchesnaye v. Munro
Enters., Inc., 480 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1984).
"9 480 A.2d at 124.
311) Id.
311 Id.
312 Id.
311 Id.
:714 Id.
315 1d.
316 Id.
917
" Id.
"480 A.2d at 125.
32U Id.
s21
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After reiterating the evolution of the fault standards in libel
actions in the United States Supreme Court decisions of New York
Times, Curtis and Gertz, Justice Sauter explained that New Hamp-
shire had adopted a standard of negligence for private plaintiffs to
prove in libel actions.322
 He asserted that there was sufficient evi-
dence in the record to show that the defendant had not exercised
reasonable care. 323
 Justice Souter further reasoned that the evidence
supported a finding that the statements actually defamed the plain-
tiff. 324
Justice Souter's second libel opinion was in the 1985 case of
Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp. 325 Justice Souter, writing for the New
Hampshire Supreme Court, reversed the grant of summary judg-
ment in favor of the defendants. 326 In Nash, the plaintiff, a police
officer, had arrested Renauld Desmarais after a car chase and
charged him with driving under the influence. 327 The Keene Sentinel
printed an account of the arrest, although it failed to mention that
Desmarais had been charged with driving under the influence. 328
Desmarais went to the newspaper with a handwritten letter, which
the defendant published, alleging that the officer enjoyed assaulting
citizens and that the city had received many complaints about
him.329
 The police officer brought suit, and the court granted the
defendant's motion for summary judgment. 33°
Justice Souter began, as he had in Munro, by stating that an
opinion is not actionable unless it can be understood to imply def-
amatory facts.33 ' He explained that if an average reader could un-
derstand that the statement implied defamatory facts, then it was a
question for the jury to answer. 332
 Justice Souter indicated that
although the letter appeared on the same page as the newspaper's
322 Id. at 126. The Gertz Court allowed states to determine their own standards of fault
in private plaintiff libel cases. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 399 (1974).
323 Munro, 480 A.2d at 126. Justice Souter noted that the editorial writer knew that the
plaintiff had not made any statements during his annoying phone calls. Id.
324 See id. at 127.
323 498 A.2d 348, 349 (N.H. 1985).
326 Id.
3" Id. at 350.
328 Id.
329 Id. The letter did not mention that Desmarais had been charged with driving under
the influence. Id.
336 Id. at 351.
331 Id.
"2 Id. at 352.
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"Letter's Policy," which stated that all letters were the opinions of
their authors, this particular letter could be read as stating facts."'
Furthermore, Justice Souter held that whether the plaintiff was
a public official was also a jury question in New Hampshire.'" He
explained that a police officer should not be a public official for
purposes of New York Times because he or she does not have re-
sponsibility for the control of governmental affairs."' Justice Souter
concluded that if the jury found the officer to be a public official,
then the officer would be required to prove actual malice."
Justice Souter further determined that there was a genuine
dispute as to whether the newspaper acted with reckless disregard
for the truth, one of the two components of actual malice."' He
explained that while failure to investigate was not sufficient to find
reckless disregard, there was some evidence of actual malice in the
record."8 Justice Souter held that a plaintiff need not show clear
and convincing evidence of malice in order to survive a summary
judgment motion." Justice Souter explained that a court must find
that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to actual malice if
there is some circumstantial evidence from which to infer malice. 340
The third libel case in which Justice Souter wrote an opinion—
this time a dissent—was in the 1988 case of Keeton v. Hustler Maga-
zine, Inc."' The New Hampshire Supreme Court held that New
Hampshire would adopt the single publication rule in libel cases,
"9 Id. Justice Souter pointed out that Desmarais had printed "Specific facts" above the
letter and then began it with "As for specific facts." Id.
334
 Id. at 353.
"' Id. Although he never addressed the issue explicitly, Justice Souter made brief men-
tion of the standard of public figure, implying that the officer was not a public figure. Id.
"a Id. at 353-54.
337 1d. at 354. The other component of actual malice is knowledge of falsity. New York
Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 280 (1964). A plaintiff need only prove one or the other.
See id.
"a Keene, 498 A.2d at 354.
3" Id. at 354-55. Justice Souter concluded that it was enough that the writer had verified
the statement as to the complaints against the officer and found it to be false to show that
he should have doubted the truth of the assertions. Id. at 355.
Keene was decided before the Supreme Court announced in Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
that the plaintiff must have clear and convincing evidence in order to survive a summary
judgment motion. 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986). See supra notes 216-37 and accompanying text
for a discussion of Anderson.
3" Keene, 498 A.2d at 354.
54 ' 549 A.2d 1187, 1197 (N.H. 1988) (Souter, J., dissenting). Kathy Keeton, a former
associate publisher of Penthouse magazine, alleged that articles in five issues of Hustler mag-
azine libeled her. Id. at 1188.
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which gives the plaintiff only one cause of action for the publication
of allegedly libelous statements. 342 The Keeton majority further held
that it would apply New Hampshire's statute of limitations to allow
the plaintiff to recover even though her suit was barred in all other
states and the magazine's distribution in the state amounted to less
than one percent.343
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Souter agreed with the ma-
jority's adoption of the single publication rule. 344 He disagreed,
however, with the application of New Hampshire's statute of limi-
tations.345 Justice Sower characterized the suit as an extreme ex-
ample of forum shopping. 346 He did not agree that a statute of
limitations could be so easily classified as procedural because it has
such a decisive effect on a case."' Justice Souter explained that New
Hampshire had no interest in the suit, and that allowing it would
only bring to life a defamation action that was dead everywhere
else in the country. 348 Furthermore, Justice Souter concluded that
there was a strong interest in requiring defamation claims to be
proven more quickly because the wrong is proven with less certainty
than many other torts. 349
The foregoing opinions, written by Justices Scalia, Kennedy
and Souter, show the emerging views of these Justices in the area
of libel. Justice Scalia faced two issues that the Supreme Court
subsequently addressed: the applicability of the clear and convinc-
ing burden of proof to a summary judgment motion and whether
opinion is entitled to absolute protection. 35° In Liberty Lobby, Justice
Scalia held that trial courts should not use the clear and convincing
3" Id. at 1190. At common law, the multiple publication rule afforded plaintiffs one
cause of action for each sale or delivery of the allegedly libelous publication. Id. at 1189
(emphasis added). This rule became extremely burdensome for defendants who, due to the
development of mass distribution, could potentially face scores of libel suits throughout the
country. Id. In response, many courts adopted the single publication rule. Id.
343 Id. at 1197. An Ohio court dismissed Keeton's original suit because it was barred by
Ohio's one-year statute of limitations. Id. at 1188. By that time, every state except New
Hampshire, with its six-year statute of limitations, barred Keeton's suit. Id.
344 Id. at 1197 (Souter, J., dissenting).
345 Id.
3" Id.
347 Id. at 1198. Justice Souter first pointed to the borrowing statutes in about 35 states,
which eliminated the rule that the forum apply its own statute of limitations. Id. at 1199. He
further cited a long list of commentators who argue against a formalistic application of
statutes of limitations as procedural. See id. at 1199-200.
343 Id. at 1204.
3" Id.
330 Oilman v. Evans, 750 F.2d 970,1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Liberty
Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, 746 F.2d 1563,1565 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 477 U.S. 242 (1986).
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evidentiary standard for purposes of summary judgment."' In a
dissent in Oilman, he argued that opinion was adequately protected
by existing precedent. 352 Justice Kennedy's only libel opinion came
in a procedural case in which he stated that, due to the nature of
the press, a different jurisdictional analysis applied in defamation
cases. 353 Justice Souter, like Justice Scalia, addressed the constitu-
tional protection given to statements of opinion in two separate
cases.354 In Keene, he concluded that the statements implied defa-
matory facts and were thus not opinion. 355 Although some of these
cases were procedural in nature, others gave the would-be Justices
an opportunity to develop their views on libel before their appoint-
ments to the Supreme Court.
III.  VICTORIES AND LOSSES FOR THE PRESS UNDER THE
REHNQUIST COURT
On September 26, 1986, President Ronald Reagan elevated
Associate Justice Rehnquist to the position of Chief Justice. 356
Nearly two years later, in the 1988 case of Hustler Magazine, Inc. v.
Falwell, Chief Justice Rehnquist wrote for a unanimous Court in his
first print media libel case since becoming Chief Justice."' The
Supreme Court held in Hustler that public figures and public offi-
cials must prove actual malice in order to recover for intentional
infliction of emotional distress. 358
In Hustler, Jerry Falwell, a nationally recognized minister and
commentator, sued Hustler magazine for publishing an advertise-
ment that was a parody depicting Falwell and his mother in a
"drunken incestuous rendezvous." 359 Underneath the ad appeared
a disclaimer, "ad parody—not to be taken seriously." s" Falwell
brought a suit for invasion of privacy, libel and intentional infliction
55L Liberty Lobby, 746 F.2d at 1570.
552 Oilman, 750 F.2d at 1036.
3" Church of Scientology of Cal. v. Adams, 584 F.2d 893, 897 (9th Cir. 1978).
554 Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp„ 498 A.2d 348, 351-52 (N.H. 1985); Duchesnayc v.
Munro Enters., Inc., 480 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1984).
555 Keno, 498 A.2d at 352; see also Munro, 480 A.2d at 125 (statement must be read in
context to be defamatory).
555 See Taylor, supra note 248, at 8. On the same day, ChiefJustice Rehnquist administered
the oath for Associate Justice Antonin Scalia. Id.
557 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1988).
I" Id. at 56.
339 Id. at 47-48.
556 Id. at 48.
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of emotional distress.s 6 ' At trial, Falwell won only the claim of
intentional infliction of emotional distress. 362 The United States
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit rejected Hustler's argument
that Falwell was required to meet the New York Times standard of
actual malice to recover for emotional distress.363 Consequently, the
court of appeals affirmed the judgment. 364 The United States Su-
preme Court reversed the court of appeals decision. 365
The Supreme Court began by declaring that the "free flow of
ideas" was at the heart of the First Amendment. 366 Moreover, the
Court emphasized the dictum from Gertz that there is no such thing
as a false idea under the First Amendment. 367 Robust debate, the
Court continued, is bound to produce criticism of public figures
and public officials. 368 Chief Justice Rehnquist explained that the
New York Times standard of actual malice for public figures and
officials ensures that the First Amendment will have its necessary
"breathing space."369 The Court reasoned that requiring proof of
actual malice to recover for emotional distress was necessary to
protect the work of political cartoonists and satirists. 37° Although
the Court implied that the ad parody in question was more outra-
geous than traditional political cartoons, it nevertheless deserved
the protection of the First Amendment. 371 Justice White wrote a
one-paragraph concurrence in which he stated that although New
York Times had "little to do with this case," because the ad did not
contain any assertions of fact, he agreed that under the First
Amendment, Hustler could not be punished for publishing the ad. 372
The following year, the Supreme Court once again faced a
procedural question in the 1989 case of Harte -Hanks Communications,
Inc. v. Connaughton. 373 The Court held that an appellate court must
361 Id. at 47-48.
362 Id. at 49. The jury awarded Falwell $100,000 in compensatory damages and $50,000
punitive damages from both Hustler and its publisher, Larry Flynt. Id.
30 Id.
564 Id.
565 1d. at 57.
566 Id. at 50.
367 U.S. at 51.
.168 Id.
mg Id. at 52.
570 Id. at 53.
3" Id. at 55. Chief Justice Rehnquist referred to a prior case in which the Supreme Court
had declared that "the fact that society may find speech offensive is not a sufficient reason
for suppressing it." Id. at 55 (quoting FCC v. Pacifica Found., 438 U.S. 726, 745 (1978)).
3" Id. at 57.
975 491 U.S. 657, 659 (1989).
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review the entire factual record to determine whether the plaintiff
had proved actual malice. 374 The Supreme Court concluded that an
examination of the record should be based on those facts the jury
did find and not on those facts that the jury might have found.s 75
The Harte-Hanks case arose after the plaintiff, Daniel Con-
naughton, ran unsuccessfully for Municipal Judge of Hamilton,
Ohio. 576 A month before the election, the incumbent judge's Direc-
tor of Court Services resigned and was arrested on bribery
charges. 377 A grand jury investigation ensued, and the Journal News,
published by Harte-Hanks, ran a front page story about two women
who claimed that Connaughton had used "dirty tricks" and had
offered them a trip to Florida "in appreciation" for their assistance
in the investigation. 378 In response to these allegations, Connaugh-
ton filed a libel action. 379 The jury found in favor of Connaugh-
ton.'" The United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
affirmed the jury's decision."'
Writing for the Supreme Court in Harte-Hanks, Justice Stevens
stated that determining whether the evidence is enough to support
a finding of actual malice is a question of law." 2 Although the Court
acknowledged that reporting on political campaigns is essential to
our democracy, it stated that the press does not enjoy complete
immunity.383 In affirming the judgment, the Supreme Court disa-
greed with the rationale of the Sixth Circuit. 984 While the court of
appeals based its review of actual malice on what a jury could have
found, the Supreme Court thought it better to review the record
based only on what the jury did find, as stated in its answers to the
special interrogatories.'" After reviewing the record in great detail,
the Supreme Court held that there was enough evidence to support
a decision against Harte-Hanks." 6
374 Id. at 688-89.
31• Id. at 690.
316 Id. at 660.
3" Id.
378 Id.
378 Id.
366 Id. at 661. The jury awarded him $5,000 in compensatory damages and $195,000 in
punitive damages. Id.
38 ' Id. at 662.
382 491 U.S. at 685.
"1 /d. at 687-88.
384 Id. at 689.
385 Id. at 689-90.
366 Id. at 693.
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Although there were no dissents to the Court's opinion in Harte-
Hanks, four Justices wrote separate concurrences. 3" First, Justice
White, a dissenter in Bose, was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist. 388
Justice White maintained his position in Bose that deciding knowl-
edge of falsity for actual malice was a historical fact subject to review
only under the clearly erroneous standard of Rule 52(a). 389 Never-
theless, Justice White believed that Harte-Hanks hinged on the "reck-
less disregard" component of actual malice, something that is not a
historical fact and thus can be subject to an independent review. 390
. Justice Blackmun's concurrence stressed that he read the
Court's opinion as having taken into account the form and content
of the story in deciding actual malice."' In other words, Justice
Blackmun argued that if the newspaper had presented the allega-
tions as confirmed facts, this would have shown reckless disregard
for the truth. 392 Nevertheless, Justice Blackmun reasoned that even
taking the article's content and form into account, which he believed
the majority did, there was sufficient evidence to support a finding
of actual malice. 393
In a separate concurrence, Justice Scalia stated that he agreed
with the rationale of the court of appeals. 394
 Justice Scalia reasoned
that a better analysis than the majority's was to consider all the
findings that a jury could have made instead of limiting the focus
to only those findings that the jury did make. 395 Justice Kennedy's
one-sentence concurrence stated that because the analysis of the
majority and that of Justice Scalia was consistent, he joined the
Court's opinion. 396
In 1990, the Supreme Court once again split in the case of
Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co. 397
 In an opinion written by Chief
Justice Rehnquist, the Supreme Court held that the First Amend-
ment does not require a separate privilege for statements catego-
rized as opinion.398
 Furthermore, the Court explained that a rea-
387
 Id. at 694 (White, J., concurring); id. (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 696 (Kennedy,
J., concurring); id. (Scalia, J., concurring).
333
 Id. at 694 (White, J., concurring).
389 Id.
3" Id.
39 ' Id. at 695 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
"2 491 U.S. at 695.
333
 Id. at 696.
391
	 (Scalia, J., concurring).
3" Id. at 697.
398
 Id. at 696 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
337
 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2697 (1990); id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
898 Id. at 2698, 2706.
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sonable juror could conclude that the article in dispute implied an
assertion of fact that could be proven true or false and could thus
be actionable. 399
In Milkovich, the plaintiff was a high school wrestling coach in
Ohio whose team was involved in a fight with members of an op-
posing team.40° The Ohio High School Athletic Association
(OHSAA) held a disciplinary hearing in which Milkovich and Scott,
the school superintendent, testified. 4° 1 After OHSAA placed Mil-
kovich's team on probation for one year and declared the team
ineligible for the state tournament, team members and their parents
brought suit against OHSAA for denial of due process. 4 U 2 Milkovich
and Scott testified once more."' The court of common pleas re-
versed the OHSAA decision.'" The following day, the News-Herald,
a local newspaper owned by the Lorain-Journal Company, printed
an article on both hearings alleging that both Milkovich and Scott
had lied in their testimony. 405 Milkovich and Scott filed separate
defamation suits.406 Both lost their cases in the state system after
the Ohio Supreme Court held that the article was constitutionally
protected opinion. 4°7
The United States Supreme Court began by. tracing its past
decisions from New York Times through Hepps. 408 The Court recog-
nized as dictum the Gertz statement that there is no such thing as a
false idea. 409 The Supreme Court explained that if read in context,
399
	 at 2707.
400 Id. at 2698.
401
403
403 Id.
4('3 Id.
4" 110 S. Ct. at 2698. Part of the article told of a lesson that the students had learned
as a result of the controversy:
It is simply this: If you get in a jam, lie your way out.
If you're successful enough, and powerful enough, and can sound sincere
enough, you stand an excellent chance of making the lie stand up, regardless
of what really happened.
The teachers responsible [for this lesson] were mainly head Maple wrestling
coach Mike Milkovich and former superintendent of schools, H. Donald Scott.
Id.
406 Id. at 2699-700.
407 Id. at 2700.
4°8 Id. at 2703-04.
40 Id. at 2705 (quoting Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323,339-40 (1974)). The
Gertz dictum the Court quoted is as follows:
Under the First Amendment there is no such thing as a false idea. However
pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
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the statement equated the words "opinion" and "idea." 41° The Court
further reasoned that..the Gertz dictum was not intended to create
a defamation exemption for opinion. 4 " The Court pointed out that
statements of opinion often imply assertions of fact. 4 " The Supreme
Court concluded that Ifepps gave constitutional protection to•opin-
ions relating to matters of public concern that do not contain a
"provably false factual connotation." 4 "
The Court thus rejected the argument that a separate consti-
tutional privilege for opinion had to be created. 414 The Court wrote
that the standards developed in past cases protected the First
Amendment's guarantee of free and robust debate on public mat-
ters.415 The Court explained that statements that could not be rea-
sonably interpreted as conveying actual facts are already protected
to ensure that there will not be a lack of "imaginative expression"
or "rhetorical hyperbole" in public debate. 416 Moreover, the Court
recognized that its decision would provide the proper balance be-
tween the First Amendment and an individual's interest in reputa-
tion. 417
 The Chief Justice explained that the allegation that Milkov-
ich perjured himself was capable of being proven true or false by a
jury and was thus actionable's Further, the language was not fig-
urative or hyperbolic, which would run counter to the understand-
ing that the article claimed that Milkovich had committed perjury. 419
In sum, the Court held that the First Amendment does not require
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas. But there
is no constitutional value in false statements of fact.
Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2705 (quoting Gertz, 418 U.S. at 339-40).
410 Id.
"I Id.
412 1d.
41] Id. at 2706. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated as an example, "[On my opinion Mayor
Jones shows his abysmal ignorance by accepting the teachings of Marx and Lenin," is not
actionable because it cannot be provable as false. Id.
914 1d. Chief Justice Rehnquist stated that the First Amendment's breathing space is
sufficiently secured "by existing constitutional doctrine without the creation of an artificial
dichotomy between 'opinion' and fact." Id.
415 Id. The Court specifically cited to the requirements of New York Times, Curtis and
Gertz. Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
416 Id.
417 Id. at 2707-08. As it has in many past libel cases, the Supreme Court once again
quoted Justice Stewart's concurring opinion in Rosenblatt v. Baer: "The right of a man to the
protection of his own reputation front unjustified invasion and wrongful hurt reflects no
more than our basic concept of the essential dignity and worth of every human being—a
concept at the root of any decent system of ordered liberty." Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2708
(quoting Rosenblatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75,92 (1966)).
918 Id. at 2707.
419 Id.
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the creation of a separate privilege for speech categorized as opin-
ion.420
In his dissent, Justice Brennan, joined by Justice Marshall,
agreed with the Court's rationale that only those defamatory state-
ments that are provably false can be the basis for liability. 421 He
objected primarily to the application of the law to the specific facts
of the case.422 Justice Brennan believed that a reasonable reader
would not interpret the article as fact that Milkovich had perjured
himself, because of the writer's use of words such as "seemed,"
"probably" and "apparently."423 Moi-eover, Justice Brennan pointed
out that the article was a signed editorial, which alerted readers that
the contents of the column were the writer's opinion.424
In 1991, the Supreme Court considered the question of defa-
mation resulting from quotes attributed to the plaintiff in the case
of Masson v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc. 425 In Masson, the Court held
that the deliberate alteration of quotations does not meet the req-
uisite knowledge of falsity under New York Times unless it results in
a "material change" in its meaning. 426 The Supreme Court further
stated that while the use of quotes is relevant in determining the
change in meaning, it is not always dispositive. 427
In Masson, the Sigmund Freud Archives fired the plaintiff,
Jeffrey M. Masson, from his position as Projects Director after he
publicly departed from Freud's theories. 428 Janet Malcolm, a writer
and contributor to the New Yorker, later conducted a series of inter-
views with Masson.429 The resulting articles, later published as a
book, portrayed the plaintiff negatively.43° For example, the article
included quotes by Masson referring to himself as an "intellectual
gigolo"43 ' and "the greatest analyst who ever lived."452 The plaintiff
then brought a libel action against the New Yorker. 433 The district
420 Id.
421 Id. at 2708 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan stated that the majority analyzed
the issue "cogently and almost entirely correctly." Id.
ov Id. at 2709 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
413 Id. at 2711.
424 Id. at 2713.
403 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991).
4" Id. at 2433.
421 1d.
428 Id. at 2424.
4" Id.
4" Id. at 2425.
4" Id.
432
	 at 2427.
4" Id, at 2425.
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court granted the New Yorker's motion for summary judgment, find-
ing that the quotes that the plaintiff alleged to be fabricated were
either substantially true, or were one of many rational interpreta-
tions of an ambiguous interview. 434 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment, 4" but the
United States Supreme Court reversed. 436
In an opinion written by Justice Kennedy, the Supreme Court
in Masson began by noting that the plaintiff was a public figure as
defined by Gertz and was thus required to prove actual malice under
the New York Times rule.437 The Court pointed out that the use of
quotations adds "authority to the statement and credibility to the
author's work."438 Thus, the Court reasoned that quotations injure
an individual's reputation because either the statement is untrue or
because the attribution casts the individual in a negative light. 439
The Court explained that in this case, because the article was pre-
sented as nonfiction and appeared in a reputable magazine, readers
would likely take the quotes at face value and assume they were
true. 44°
The Supreme Court maintained that writers always change
quotes, even if it is for the purpose of correcting grammar. 44 i The
Court explained, however, that alteration beyond changing gram-
mar does not alone prove falsity to establish actual malice. 442 Thus,
the Court concluded that deliberately altering quotations does not
meet the requisite knowledge of falsity under New York Times unless
it results in a "material change" in meaning. 443 In analyzing the
alleged defamatory statements, the Court determined that five of
the six tape-recorded statements in dispute differed materially from
the quoted statements. 444
Furthermore, the Supreme Court disagreed with the court of
appeals' test of "substantial truth." 445 The court of appeals indicated
4" Id. at 2428.
4" Id. at 2429.
436 Id.
4"11 l S. Ct. at 2429. The Court stated, "iw]e have used the term actual malice as a
shorthand to describe the First Amendment protections for speech injurious to reputation
and we continue to do so here." Id. at 2430.
"8 Id.
4" Id. The Court reasoned that "a self-condemnatory quotation may carry more force
than criticism by another." Id.
449 Id. at 2431.
441 Id. at 2432.
44s
448 Id. at 2433.
441 Id. at 2435-37.
"5 /d. at 2433.
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that it had drawn this test—that speech is protected as long as it is
a rational interpretation of the statement actually made—from two
prior Supreme Court decisions, Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of
United States, Inc. and Time, Inc. v. Pape. 446 The Supreme Court
explained that rational interpretation is not applicable when a writer
uses quotes because the individual is presumably speaking for him
or herself."' The Court reasoned that allowing writers to put quotes
around statements without liability does not serve First Amendment
values. 448 The Supreme Court found, using its own test, sufficient
evidence to support a jury finding for the plaintiff and thus reversed
the grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendants. 449
Justice White, joined by Justice Scalia, agreed with the reversal
of summary judgment, but dissented from the Court's adoption of
the "material alteration" rule.'" He argued that under New York
Times, writing what is known to be false is ample proof of actual
malice.4" Justice White maintained that the issue was for the jury
to decide, and thus the New Yorker was not entitled to summary
judgment with regard to any of the six quotations. 452
IV. THE FORMATION OF COALITIONS IN PRINT MEDIA LIBEL CASES
In general, the law of defamation has had a chaotic develop-
ment. 4" This is evidenced by the fact that no one opinion in any
446 111 S. Ct. at 2433 (citing Bose, 466 U.S. 485, 512 (1984); Pape, 401 U.S. 279, 290
(1971)). The Pape case was based on a Time magazine article about police brutality taken
from a report published by the United States Commission on Civil Rights. 401 U.S. at 280.
The magazine quoted at length from the report without knowing that it was based on a civil
complaint and not on findings of the Commission. Id. at 282. Moreover, the article did not
contain the word "alleged" to describe the events. Id. at 283. The Supreme Court wrote that
Time's 'omission of the word 'alleged' amounted to the adoption of one of a number of
possible rational interpretations of a document that bristled with ambiguities." Id. at 290.
The Court stated that to prove actual malice, there must be sufficient evidence to show that
the defendant "in fact entertained serious doubts as to the truth of his publication." Id.
(quoting St. Amara v. Thompson, 390 U.S. 727, 731 (1968)). The Supreme Court therefore
concluded that to allow the issue to go to the jury would impose a "stricter: standard of
liability on errors of interpretation or judgment than on errors of historic fact." Id.
447 1d. at 2434.
4481d.
449 Id. at 2437.
45° Id. (White, J., dissenting).
4" Id. at 2437-38.
952 Id. at 2438.
459
	
scholar states that the "law of defamation is dripping with contradictions and
confusion and is vivid testimony to the sometimes perverse ingenuity of the legal mind. From
its inception, the law of defamation has been singularly bent on establishing its reputation
for quirky terminology and byzantine doctrine." Smolla, supra note 199, at 1519.
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major case has commanded all nine votes of the Justices.454 The
development of libel law thus seems to be one that has come about
through coalitions. Even when the Supreme Court agrees on an
outcome, the rationale of the Justices may differ widely, sometimes
creating unusual divisions.455
In the earlier cases, the emerging coalitions were more polar-
ized than those in the present Supreme Court. For instance, Justices
Black and Douglas concurred in New York Times because they did
not believe that the First Amendment allowed states to enact libel
laws.456
 Although New York Times is lauded as a victory for the press,
Justices Black and Douglas would have wanted a stronger triumph.
Both Justices maintained this absolutist position in later cases as
wel1.457
 No other Justice since then has advocated for a standard of
absolute immunity for the press.
The importance of the state interest in protecting the reputa-
tion of its citizens became the grounds for a second type of coalition
on the Court. 458 In Hepps, Chief Justice Burger and Justices White
and Rehnquist joined Justice Stevens's dissent to admonish the ma-
jority for placing too little weight on the state's interest in redressing
defamation.459 Chief Justice Burger had previously articulated a
similar stance in Gertz when he argued that the Court should not
interfere with existing state libel laws regarding private citizens. 46°
Furthermore, Justice White's opinions in Time and Bose suggest his
deferential attitude toward the findings of lower courts."'
Justice Brennan's opinion in Rosenbloom extending constitu-
tional protection to all issues of public or general concern created
a third type of coalition. 462 Three years later, in Gertz, both Justices
454 See supra notes 24-243, 356-452 and accompanying text for a discussion of the major
libel cases decided since New York Times.
4" Cf. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 257 (1986) (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); id. at 268 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) with Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 354
(1974) (Burger, CJ., dissenting); id. at 355 (Douglas, J., dissenting); id. at 361 (Brennan, J.,
dissenting); id. at 369 (White, J., dissenting).
456 376 U.S. 254, 293 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
457 See Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (Black, J., concurring);
Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 170 (1967) (Black and Douglas, J.J., concurring).
458 See, e.g., Philadelphia Newsp., Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 780 (1986) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
459 Id. at 781.
46°418 U.S. 323, 354 (1974) (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
46' Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 515 (1984)
(White, J., dissenting) (de novo review not appropriate on knowledge of falsity); Time, Inc.
v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 481 (1976) (Whited., dissenting) (ample evidence that lower court
found fault).
'" Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 44 (1971).
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Brennan and Blackmun, although writing separately, agreed that
Rosenbloom was a more logical extension of libel law. 463 Justice Bren-
nan stated his belief that the Rosenbloom standard focusing on issues
of general concern extended from New York Times's commitment to
the importance of debate on public issues. 464 In Hepps, Justices
Brennan and Blackmun returned to the idea of constitutional pro-
tection for speech of public concern. 465 The Hepps majority, led by
Justice O'Connor, also echoed the notion of issues of general con-
cern.466 In fact, Hepps seems very much like Rosenbloom in proce-
dural clothing. 467
The Rehnquist Court has become more consolidated than past
Courts in libel cases, yet the coalitions, though perhaps blurred,
have continued. The Hustler case, where the Court held that public
officials and public figures must prove actual malice to recover for
intentional infliction of emotional distress, came the closest to gain-
ing the votes of the entire Court.468 The Hustler decision, probably
the strongest press victory under the Rehnquist Court, stopped the
threat to New York Times posed by emotional harm cases brought by
plaintiffs in • an attempt to get around the actual malice require-
ment. 469 One plaintiffs' attorney claims that Hustler illustrates the
willingness of conservative judges to greatly increase the First
Amendment protections given to the press. 4" Hustler's reaffirmance
of New York Times does exemplify the type of strong coalition likely
to develop even among the more conservative Justices when either
a prominent figure sues the media or when the statements at issue
involve political expression. Such a case would go to the core of
New York Times.
The three other cases decided by the Rehnquist Court—Harte-
Hanks, Milkovich and Masson—are not as easily categorized as vic-
tories or defeats. 4" In Harte-Hanks, for example, the press lost
"3 418 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun, J., concurring); id. at 362 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
464 403 U.S. at 43-44; see also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 361-62 (1974)
(quoting Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 43-44).
495 466 U.S. at 779-80.
496 1d. at 775.
467 See id.
1" 485 U.S. 46, 56 (1988). Only Justice White wrote separately, because he disagreed
with the application of New. York Times to the case. Id. at 57 (White, J., concurring).
189
 See Michael P. McDonald, Libel Law Lives! Reports of Demise False, LEGAL TIMES, May
28, 1990, at 23.
470 1d.
471 See Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2433 (1991); Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2698, 2706 (1990); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc.
v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 689-90 (1989).
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because the Supreme Court reversed a lower court's grant of sum-
mary judgment in favor of the press, yet the Court was merely
upholding the standard of independent appellate review so impor-
tant in both New York Times and Bose. 472 Justice White, joined by
Chief Justice Rehnquist, adhered to his past view that historical
facts are only reviewable under the clearly erroneous standard. 473
Thus, it is possible that Justice White could persuade other Justices
in later cases to form a coalition in order to give a high degree of
deference to lower court judgments.
While some argue that the Supreme Court was "nibbling at the
edges of New York Times," 474 one commentator suggests that Haile-
Hanks was in some ways a press victory because it proved how
forcefully the Court will impose the requirement of an independent
review, evidenced by Justice Stevens's lengthy review of the rec-
ord. 475
 Other commentators support that claim by asserting that the
Harte-Hanks decision did not weaken the press's protection against
libel suits because the Supreme Court adhered to Bose:" In fact,
the Court stated that appellate courts must second-guess juries rul-
ing in favor of public figures and officials. 477
The Milkovich case, with only Justices Brennan and Marshall in
dissent, seems more typical of the growing conservative wave of
decisions. Yet, it is possible to see the formation of the same coalition
in both Milkovich and Masson. 478 The Justices in both cases wanted
to protect a free press yet did not want to allow the media to defame
private persons. In Milkovich, the Supreme Court refused to create
471 Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 693; see also Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United
States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 499 (1984) ("The New York Times rule emphasizes the need ... to
make an independent examination of the entire record."); New York Times Co. v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254, 285 (1964) ("We must make an independent examination of the whole record
so as to assure ourselves that the judgment does not constitute a forbidden intrusion on
the field of free expression.").
Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 694 (White, J., concurring).
474 Martin Garbus, Supreme Courts Recent Libel Law Rulings Impairing Media's Rights Under
Sullivan, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 5, 1989, at 1. Garbus argues that the Court, instead of focusing
solely on what was printed, found liability because the newspaper did not include information
to make the story more balanced. Id.
475 Bruce W. Sanford & Anne R. Noble, For the Press, Privacy Ruling Not Good News, NAT'L
L.J., Aug. 21, 1989, at 57.
476 Supreme Court Review, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 21, 1989, at S25.
4" Id,
4 '8 Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., Ill S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991) (Kennedy, j., delivered
the opinion of the Court, in which Rehnquist, C.J., and Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, O'Con-
nor, and Souter, j., joined); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2697 (1990)
(Rehnquist, C.J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which White, Blackmun, Stevens,
O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy, J.J., joined).
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a separate privilege for opinion, yet its rationale was that opinion
was already protected under existing constitutional doctrine"
While the press and many scholars have characterized it a def eat9480
some media attorneys argue that Milkovich only changes the way in
which the constitutional protection issue is framed without altering
the types of speech that are protected. 4" The key determination,
according to these attorneys, is still whether there is a statement of
fact that can be proven false, an essential element of a plaintiff's
prima facie case. 482 Even Justice Brennan's dissent in Milkovich
agreed with the basic reasoning of the Court's opinion and further
argued that the Court was not really changing the law.483 Another
commentator believes that Milkovich simply traded the absolute priv-
ilege that was emerging in the lower courts for the New York Times
actual malice test. 484 The decision, which applies to opinion that
implicates facts, rules that such opinion is the same as a fact. 485
One defender of Milkovich argues that its greatest danger to
the media is that of the self-fulfilling prophecy, where emphasis on
a press defeat provides the public with a false perception that libel
cases are easily won and thus a greater incentive to sue, thereby
leading to more litigation.486 Another commentator foresees two
negative repercussions for the press.487 One is that dismissals of libel
suits will be postponed until after pre-trial discovery has been con-
ducted in order to find out what the writer knew as to the under-
lying facts. 488 The second consequence is that there may be an
increase in litigation cost to differentiate between those opinions
based on factual statements and those that are not. 489 Although the
possibility of increased litigation costs always lurks in the back-
ground, Milkovich nevertheless seems to be a healthy check on the
479 Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
480 Richard C. Reuben, Justices Limit Protection for Written Opinion, L.A. DAILY J., June 22,
1990, at
" I Robert S. Warren et al., Not as Bad as ft Looks, NAT'L L.J., July 30, 1990, at 13.
4" Id. Warren argues that there has never been a wholesale exemption for opinion
because the media could not escape liability by adding "I think" before a statement and
converting it to opinion. Id.
4" Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2708-09 (1990) (Brennan, J.,
dissenting).
484 James C. Goodale, Milkovich: A Modest Loss for the Press, N.Y. L.J., June 27, 1990, at
1.
485 Milkovich, 110 S. Ct. at 2706.
488
	 supra note 481, at 13.
487
	 supra note 484, at I.
488 Id.
4" Id,
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press. The Court's decision will likely make print reporters more
careful about examining what constitutes opinion. In the end, the
Milkovich decision may have been one that turned on the facts.
Perhaps the Court believed that accusing someone of committing
perjury was too weak a basis to make a finding of opinion.
In Masson, the press lost again because the Court reversed the
prior grant of summary judgment in favor of the magazine,490 but
although the press may have lost the battle, it won the war. The
Supreme Court in Masson created a rule allowing print journalists
much greater freedom in their use of quotations by holding that
deliberately altering quotations does not amount to actual malice
unless there is a material change in meaning."' The majority co-
alition very likely saw Masson as an opportunity to uphold press
protections by allowing the media to have some breathing room.
Before Masson was even decided, some of the press distanced them-
selves from the case, considering it to be an example of unethical
journalism.492
 It seems that not even the press was sure about root-
ing for a victory in this case,495
 yet one was delivered by the Court.
It would have been egregious to allow the summary judgment mo-
tion to stand. Malcolm's use of a tape recorder should have provided
her with the exact quotes she needed, yet the printed statements
were only somewhat similar to those that appeared on the tape.
This type of unethical journalism should not be what the Court
seeks to protect, and may explain why although Justices White and
Scalia joined with the majority in Milkovich, both dissented from the
Court's ruling in Masson. 494
 Both Justices disagreed with a rule that
allowed journalists to put words in the mouths of their subjects. 495
The decision thus allows the press flexibility,496
 yet alerts them that
actual malice is still a relevant factor in libel actions.
In sum, it is fair to characterize the Rehnquist Court decisions
in Harte-Hanks and Milkovich as press defeats, and those in Hustler
and Masson, on principle, as press victories. Chief Justice Rehnqu-
ist's sweeping reaffirmation of New York Times in Hustler may have
49° Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 1 II S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (1991).
491 Id. at 2433.
492 Newsweek called Malcolm a "journalistic pariah" who had been abandoned by the
press. David A. Kaplan & Bob Cohn, When Is a Quote Not a Quote?, NEWSWEEK, Jan. 21, 1991,
at 49.
"s See id.
491
 Masson, I 1 1 S. Ct. at 2437 (White, J., dissenting); Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co.,
110 S. Ct. 2695, 2697 (1990).
' 95 Masson, 111  S. Ct. at 2438-39.
'm Ruth Marcus and Howard Kurtz, Libel Suit Against Reporter Reinstated; Writers May Be
Sued for Fabricating, Altering Quotes, High Court Rules, WASH. Post., June 21, 1991, at A 10.
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been due to a modification of his earlier views in order to build a
coalition.497
 There were fewer coalitions in the Rehnquist Court,
and cases such as Hustler are only helpful in predicting the future
outcome of certain types of cases. Against this background, this
Note will now examine the voting patterns of the current Justices
and explore the underlying principles that seem to guide each one.
V. THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF EACH JUSTICE
Since being appointed to the Supreme Court in 1971 as an
Associate Justice, Chief Justice Rehnquist has voted with the major-
ity in the press triumphs of Hustler and Masson. 498 He dissented in
the three procedural victories of the press—Bose, Hepps and Ander-
son. 499
 Furthermore, Chief Justice Rehnquist voted with the majority
in the press defeats of Gertz, Time and Milkovich. 50° From his voting
pattern, there seems to be three underlying rationales to explain
the Chief Justice's press decisions.
The first of these is that the Chief Justice seems unwilling to
extend procedural protections to the press. This is evidenced by his
dissent in Anderson, where he stated that applying a higher standard
to summary judgment motions in libel cases grants special protec-
tions to defendants that are not available in other contexts."' The
second reasoning apparent from Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinions
is his unwillingness to allow the press to intrude into the lives of
private people. This is particularly evident from his votes in Gertz
and Time—both cases where the plaintiff was perceived by the Chief
Justice to be a private person.502
 In Time, for example, he stressed
that although the plaintiff's divorce had received media attention,
she did not accept any prominent role or thrust herself into the
public eye."' His third principle is his support of the press's dis-
cussion of issues about public figures and public officials. Chief
Justice Rehnquist's sweeping opinion in Hustler, in which he showed
"7 Michael J. Gerhardt, The Role of Precedent in Constitutional Decisionmaking and Theory,
60 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 68, 128 (1991).
499
	 v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 111 S. CL 2419, 2424 (1991); Hustler Mag., Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1989).
"9
 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 268 (1986) (Rehnquist, J„ dissenting);
Philadelphia Newsp., Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 780 (1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumers
Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 515 (1984) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
NCI
 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal, 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2697 (1990); Time, Inc. v. Firestone,
424 U.S. 448, 449 (1976); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 324 (1974).
'"' Anderson, 477 U.S. at 269 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Calder v. Jones, 465
U.S. 783, 790-91 (1984)).
502 See Time, 424 U.S. at 453; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 352.
503 Time, 424 U.S. at 453.
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strong support for New York Times and seemed to go beyond what
the case before the Court required, showed that his vision is of a
free and uninhibited press in the context of public affairs. 5°4
Justice White, as the senior Associate Justice, has been present
since the New York Times decision and thus has the longest paper
trail. He has voted with the majority in many of the press's victories
since then, including Anderson, Curtis, Rosenbloom and Hustler 505
From his voting pattern, there seems to be two principles to which
he subscribes.
The first is his willingness to extend protections to the press
when it reports about public officials, public figures or what he
describes as public servants. This view is best articulated in Justice
White's concurrence in Rosenbloom. 506 Justice White voted with the
majority because he believed that the press has a First Amendment
privilege to report on official actions of public servants without
regard for the private citizens involved.507 Yet, while he agreed with
Rosenbloom, he believed that Gertz was an unwarranted intrusion into
the states' domain. 5°8 His dissents in Gertz and Time reflect his con-
cern for the rights of ordinary citizens, which are protected by
defamation law. 509 Thus, Justice White will seemingly vote against
the press when purely private plaintiffs are suing, unless the state-
ments involve the actions of public servants such as the police.
Justice White's second rationale is grounded in procedure. His
dissent in Bose and his majority vote in Harte-Hanks are at least
partly based on his belief that an appellate court should not second-
guess historical facts.m° Justice White believes that the "knowledge
of falsity" aspect of actual malice is a question best left to the jury. 5 "
5°4 See generally Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 50-53 (1988). One commen-
tator states that "what surprised—and gratified—many commentators . . . was that Chief
Justice Rehnquist elected both to author the Court's unanimous opinion and to uphold, in
emphatic terms, the petitioner's right to publish." Nat Stern, State Action, Establishment Clause,
and Defamation: Blueprints for Civil Liberties in the Rehnquist Court, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 1175,
1175-76 (1989).
"5 See Hustler, 485 U.S. at 57 (White, J., concurring); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.,
477 U.S. 242, 244 (1986); Rosenbloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 57 (1971) (White,
J., concurring); Curtis Publishing Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130, 172 (1967).
505 403 U.S. at 62 (White, J., concurring).
5°7 Id.
"5 Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 370 (1974) (White, J., dissenting).
"Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 483 (1976) (White, J., dissenting); Gertz, 418
U.S. at 369-70 (White, J., dissenting).
515 Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 694 (1989) (White,
J., dissenting); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 515
(1984) (White, J., dissenting).
5 " Harte-Hanks, 491 U.S. at 694.
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Although Justice Blackmun is second in seniority to Justice
White, he has written relatively little in the area of libel, authoring
only two concurrences. The curious fact is that he has not dissented
in any of the ten cases in which he has voted. Generally, Justice
Blackmun seems to be an ally of the press, as is evidenced by his
votes for the press in Rosenbloom, Bose, Hepps, Anderson, Hustler and
Masson. 5 l 2 He did vote with the majority, however, in the press losses
of Gertz, Time, Harte-Hanks and Milkovich. 513
Blackmun's two concurrences reveal very little about the Jus-
tice's views on libel. In the past, he sided with Justice Brennan to
form a coalition based on the Rosenbloom doctrine of issues of public
concern. 514 His two-page concurrence in Gertz emphasized his pref-
erence for the approach in Rosenbloom. 518 He concurred in order
for the Court to have a clearly established majority, because he
feared that the area of libel would become too uncertain without a
definitive ruling. 516 His later concurrence in Harte-Hanks stressed
the importance of taking the form and content of an article into
account in making a determination of actual malice."' It seems this
proposition, however, is a double-edged sword. While an exami-
nation of the form and content of an article can be used to rebut
actual malice when statements appear as allegations rather than
truth, it can also be used to bolster a finding of actual malice in
cases where a court may find the form objectionable. In future
cases, Justice Blackmun would likely form a coalition with Justice
O'Connor, and perhaps Justice White, to vote for the press if a
private figure is suing about speech of public concern.
Justice Stevens, perceived as part of the more liberal wing of
the Court, does tend to vote for the press in many cases, although
perhaps not as consistently as could be expected. He voted with the
majority in Bose, Anderson, Hustler and Masson.518 Nevertheless, jus-
512 Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991); Hustler Mag., Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1989); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 243 (1986);
Philadelphia Newsp., Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768 (1986); Bose, 466 U.S. at 487; Rosen-
bloom v. Metromedia, Inc., 403 U.S. 29, 30 (1971).
5 " Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2697 (1990); Harte-Hanks, 49l U.S.
at 694 (Blackmun, J., concurring); Time, 424 U.S. at 449; Gertz, 418 U.S. at 353 (Blackmun,
J., concurring).
5" See Gertz, 418 U.S. at 353; Rosenbloom, 403 U.S. at 30.
515 Gertz, 418 U.S. at 353.
"6 1d. at 354.
5 t 7 491 U.S. at 695.
3111 See Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991); Hustler Mag.,
Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 47 (1989); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 243
(1986); Bose Corp. v. Consumers Union of United States, Inc., 466 U.S. 485, 487 (1984).
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tice Stevens's dissent in Hepps emphasizes his concern for the indi-
vidual's right to protect his or her reputation. He criticized the
Court's opinion, written by Justice O'Connor, for not giving more
weight to this important interest. 519 In fact, Justice Stevens refers
to the press several times in his dissent as character assassins. 520 One
commentator finds Justice Stevens's dissent in Hepps rather trou-
bling. 521
Justice Stevens also voted with the majority in the press defeats
of Harte-Hanks and Milkovich. 522 Although Harte-Hanks upheld the
principle of independent appellate review, it gave the press its first
loss in the Supreme Court in many years. 523 Despite its defenders,
one commentator argues that Harte-Hanks was a blow to the press
because the Court found liability based on the newspaper's failure
to include information to make the story more balanced. 524
Justice O'Connor, the author of the Hepps opinion, surprised
many commentators with her decision. 525
 One commentator stated
that after Hepps, the media sighed with relief because Justice O'Con-
nor's opinion "went for the jugular." 526
 The curious observation is
that her record is almost exactly the same as Justice Stevens's record.
The only difference is that while Justice Stevens dissented in Hepps
and voted with the majority in Bose, Justice O'Connor wrote the
Hepps majority opinion and dissented in Bose. Justice O'Connor's
dissent in Bose, where she joined the Chief Justice's opinion, may
be based on her belief that an appellate court should not look at
issues of credibility. The two cases where she went against the
press—Milkovich and Harte-Hanks—may have been based on the
weak facts of those particular cases. One commentator suggests that
Justice O'Connor's previous political experience in the Arizona leg-
islature explains her greater sympathy toward the press. 527 Justice
O'Connor has been characterized as being the center of the Court,
519 See 475 U.S. at 781 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
520 Id. at 785.
521 Bull, supra note 238, at 791. Bull's concern stems from his belief that Stevens has
"traditionally brought an intelligent approach to First Amendment concerns." Id.
522 Milkovich v. Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2697 (1990); Harie-Hanks, 491 U.S.
at 659.
5" News Media's Wins and Losses, NATI	 Dec. 22, 1990, at 3088.
524 See Garbus, supra note 474, at I.
525
 Philadelphia Newsp., Inc. v. Hepps, 475 U.S. 767, 768 (1986); Bull, supra note 238,
at 787. This journalist states that Hepps was an unexpected opinion from a Justice who "has
not been particularly sensitive to press concerns." Id.
525 Smolla, supra note 199, at 1527.
527 Tofel, supra note 238, at 18.
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willing to part with "conservatives" in libel cases.528 As evidenced by
her opinion in Hepps, O'Connor may be one of the Justices who is
most similar to Justice Brennan in the area of libel.
Justice Scalia's only opinion in the area of libel while on the
Supreme Court is a concurrence in Harte-Hanks. 529 Although he
voted against the press in Harte-Hanks, Milkovich and Masson, he
voted with the majority in Hustler. 554) Of the conservative Justices,
Justice Scalia seems to be the least receptive to the press in libel
actions."' Both of his lower court libel opinions were press defeats.
In Liberty Lobby, Inc. v. Anderson, he reversed summary judgment
and held that the convincing clarity evidentiary standard was not
relevant in deciding on the motion. 582 Just two years later, the
Supreme Court overturned the decision." 3 Furthermore, in Oilman
v. Evans, Justice Scalia dissented from the majority's ruling that the
statements in dispute were protected Opinion. 584 This latter case
explains his vote with the majority in Milkovich.535
First, it seems that Justice Scalia, much like, Chief justice Rehn-
quist in this respect, is against the extension of procedural protec-
tions for the press. His opinion in Liberty Lobby shows that he would
have likely voted against the press in its other procedural victories
on the Supreme Court. 888 Second, Justice Scalia does not like to
permit the press to publish what he perceives to be defamatory
statements by labeling it opinion. This is evident from his dissent
in Oilman."' Furthermore, his continued belief in judicial restraint
extends to libel because his preference, as he stated in Oilman, is to
see the area dealt with by the legislature." 8
Justice Kennedy wrote the majority opinion in Masson and
voted with the majorities in Harte-Hanks and Milicovich. 599 His opin-
518 Stuart Taylor, Jr., Swing Vote on the Constitution, AM. LAW., June 1989, at 66.
529
 491 U.S. 657, 696 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring).
"Id.; Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 111  S. Ct. 2419, 2437 (1991); Milkovich v.
Lorain Journal Co., 110 S. Ct, 2695, 2697 (1990); Hustler Mag., Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46,
47 (1989).
731 See, e.g., Scalia Decisions in Court of Appeals Show That New Justice is No Friend of News
Media, NEWS MEDEA & L., Fall 1986, at 3.
3" 746 F.2d 1563, 1570 (D.C. Cir. 1984), vacated, 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).
"' Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252.
5" 750 F.2d 970, 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
555 See 110 S. Ct. at 2697.
335 See 746 F.2d at 1570.
557 See 750 F.2d at 1036 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
"5 Id. at 1038.
539 Masson v. New Yorker Mag., Inc., 1 l 1 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991); Milkovich v. Lorain
Journal Co., 110 S. Ct. 2695, 2697 (1990); Harte-Hanks Communications, Inc. v. Connaugh-
ton, 491 U.S. 657, 696 (1989) (Kennedy, J., concurring).
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ion in Masson gave the press great latitude in its use of quotations. 5"
Perhaps he also decided against the press in Harte-Hanks and Mil-
kovich based on the facts.
Although Justice Kennedy is usually seen as a consistent mem-
ber of the conservative bloc, it seems difficult to predict, based on
what little information is available, what he is likely to do in libel
cases. His Ninth Circuit opinion in Church of Scientology v. Adams
provides little direction because it was based on a jurisdictional
analysis. 541 Justice Kennedy in Adams did alter the analysis in libel
cases, because he believed the traditional jurisdictional analysis was
unfair to the press. 542
The Masson case, however, is the one that shows Justice Ken-
nedy's sensitivity to the press.543 The importance of the case was
not its decision regarding the New Yorker's summary judgment mo-
tion, but the Court's rule that deliberate alteration of quotations
does not amount to actual malice unless there is a material change
in meaning. The rule Justice Kennedy articulated prevents an ov-
erflow of libel actions by public figures who disagree with the way
they are portrayed. 544 The press received Justice Kennedy well
when he joined the Supreme Court, and it seems that thus far, he
has provided no reason to disappoint them. 545
• Since his appointment in 1990, Justice Souter has participated
in only one libel case—Masson, in which he voted with the major-
ity. 546
 His three opinions while on the New Hampshire Supreme
Court—two majority opinions and one dissent—show a cautious
judge who examines the facts closely. 547 Although Justice Souter's
dissent in Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc. was based on a statute of
limitations analysis, his result would not have allowed a libel suit
that was barred everywhere else in the nation. 548
Justice Souter's opinions in Duchesnaye v. Munro Enterprises, Inc.
and Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp. show his concern, and his antic-
54°
 Ill S. Ct. at 2433.
341 See 584 F.2d 893, 897, 899 (9th Cir. 1978).
342 Id. at 897.
543 Linda Greenhouse, Justices Refuse to Open a Cate for Libel Cases, N.Y. TIMES, June 21,
1991, at I.
"4
 Id.
54 ' John Hanrahan, Press Has Ally in Court Nominee, PA. L.J.-RzP., Dec. 7, 1987, at 12.
346 I 1 1 S. Ct. 2419, 2424 (1991).
547 See generally Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 549 A.2d 1187, 1197 (N.H. 1988) (Sauter,
J., dissenting); Nash v. Keene Publishing Corp„ 498 A.2d 348, 349 (N.H. 1985); Duchesnaye
v. Munro Enters., Inc., 480 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1984).
54g 549 A.2d at 1204 (Sauter, J., dissenting).
December 1992]	 LIBEL	 135
ipation of the Supreme Court's direction, with the distinction be-
tween fact and opinion. 549 The facts of Munro can alone justify his
affirmance of a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. There was sufficient
evidence to show the writer of the allegedly libelous editorial knew
the falsity of what he was writing.550 In Keene, Justice Souter held
that the statements that claimed to be opinions implied defamatory
facts. 551
Based on these three opinions, it is difficult to predict Justice
Souter's future course in libel cases. The press seemed hesitant at
his appointment. 552 Nevertheless, his dissenting opinion in a non-
libel media case in 1991 may give the press some hope for the
future.555
Thus, it seems that while the Justices may have guiding prin-
ciples of their own, libel law in print media cases will likely continue
to develop in coalitions as it has since 1964. Although the precise
course may be unpredictable, the boundaries do seem to be estab-
lished. If a public figure or public official sues the press over political
speech or criticism of his or her official conduct, it is almost certain
that a majority of the Supreme Court will find in favor of the press.
In fact, it is likely that Chief Justice Rehnquist will author the
opinion, as he did in Hustler, even though political speech was not
involved in that case. If instead a private figure is suing about public
speech, a coalition headed by either Justice White or Justice O'Con-
nor will likely emerge to protect the press. Justice White would be
adhering to his preferred position in Rosenbloom, holding that the
press has a First Amendment privilege to report on actions of public
servants without concern for the private citizens involved; while
549 See Keene, 498 A.2d at 351; Munro, 480 A.2d at 125.
5" Munro, 480 A.2d at 124.
"I Id.; Keene, 498 A.2d at 352.
552 Set Thomas Collins, Souter Hasn't Declared War on the Press, NEWSDAY, Sept. 23, 1990,
at 11.
"' Justice Souter dissented, along with Justices Brennan and Marshall, in the 1991 case
of Cohen v. Cowles Media, 1 l 1 S. Ct. 2513 (1991). The Supreme Court held in Cohen that a
plaintiff can recover damages under state promissory estoppel law for a newspaper's breach
of a promise of confidentiality given to the plaintiff in exchange for information. I I 1 S. Ct.
at 2516. In dissent, Justice Souter argued that there was a need to balance the competing
interests involved to determine "the legitimacy of burdening constitutional interests." Id. at
2522 (Souter, J., dissenting).
At a constitutional law conference, Harvard Law School Professor Kathleen M. Sullivan
stated that Souter's dissent in Cohen reminded her of something Justice Brennan would have
written. Constitutional Law Conference, 60 U.S.L.W. 2253, 2266 (Oct. 22, 1991). Professor
Sullivan stated that Souter maintained that holding the press liable under a theory of
promissory estoppel will cause systemic damage to the press as an institution. Id.
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Justice O'Connor would be following her view in Hepps that if
speech is of public concern then the First Amendment requires its
protection even if the plaintiff is a private figure. Depending on
the precise nature of the speech, a dissent may be expected from
either the Chief Justice, Justice Scalia or Justice Stevens.
VI. CONCLUSION
Based on the checkered history of libel law, it may be difficult
to predict where the United States Supreme Court is headed. It
seems that a majority of the conservative Rehnquist Court is willing
to afford First Amendment protections for the press when it is sued
by public officials or public figures. Libel suits brought by private
plaintiffs are a different matter, as many of the Justices are con-
cerned with the individual's right to protect his or her reputation.
It seems the Court will defend the press against attacks by promi-
nent people, but will balance First Amendment interests against
reputational interests when private plaintiffs are involved. It is very
likely that the Supreme Court will continue to decide libel cases in
coalitions, as it has from the beginning, although the lines between
these groups may be more difficult to draw. At worst, it appears
that the Rehnquist Court has done no more to limit New York Times
than the Warren or Burger Courts. At best, it has upheld New York
Times, contrary to the expectations of critics.
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